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1929 → 2026 — The Next Great Reset

June 2026  ·  Geopolitics  ·  15 min read

Work in progress · being expanded
1929 to 2026 — The Next Great Reset

The structural set-up looks uncomfortably 1929. The exit won't. And the country that benefits most from how the exit plays out is probably India.

This is a piece I've been putting off writing because the conclusion sounds like a "buy India" pitch dressed up as macro analysis. The data made me write it anyway. I'll show the bullish case, the bearish case, and what I think is settled vs. what's open. None of this is investment advice. All of it is testable.


1. What 1929 actually was

The 1929 crash is misremembered as just a stock market event. It was a regime change.

−89%
Drop in the Dow from Sep 1929 peak to Jul 1932 trough
Dow Jones Industrial Average
25%
US unemployment rate by 1933 (peak)
BLS, NBER
~30
Shiller CAPE ratio at the 1929 peak (avg ~17)
Robert Shiller, Yale
1944
Year the dollar was anointed reserve currency at Bretton Woods — 15 years after 1929
Bretton Woods Agreement

1929 wasn't just a crash. It was the start of a 15-year reshuffle that ended with the dollar replacing the pound sterling as the world's reserve currency, the gold standard abandoned, the US becoming the world's industrial centre, and a multi-decade transfer of capital from the old empires to the new one. The shape of the global financial system in 1945 was unrecognisable from 1925.

Crashes don't just destroy value. They reorder where the value goes next.


2. 2026 looks uncomfortably similar — by the numbers

Almost every structural indicator that flashed red in 1929 is flashing red again, in some cases brighter. This isn't conspiracy talk. It's the data.

Shiller CAPE ratio (S&P 500), 1900 → 2026

A long-horizon measure of stock-market expensiveness. Historical mean ≈ 17.
45 35 25 15 5 0 historical mean ≈ 17 1900 1929 1950 1980 2000 2008 2020 2024 ~30 ~44 ~36 1929 Dot-com Today
Source: Robert Shiller, Yale — cyclically adjusted P/E (10-year inflation-adjusted earnings)

Today's CAPE is higher than the 1929 peak. The only time it has been higher was the dot-com bubble, which preceded a 49% drawdown over three years. Note: high CAPE doesn't mean a crash tomorrow. It means the long-run expected return from these levels is structurally low — and the asymmetric downside risk is structurally high.

Other structural signals worth ranking on the same scale:

~123%
US federal debt to GDP — close to the 1946 WW2 peak of 124%
US Treasury, IMF FY24
~$1.0T
US annual interest payments on federal debt — now larger than the defence budget
CBO 2024
71% → 58%
USD share of global FX reserves: 2000 → 2024
IMF COFER
~70%
Of US equities owned by the top 10% of households (highest concentration since 1929)
Federal Reserve Z.1, 2024
~$820B
FINRA margin debt outstanding — record high
FINRA, late 2024
~5.5×
US household net worth to GDP — historic 100-year peak
Federal Reserve Z.1, 2024
The list above is not a forecast. It is a description of fragility. Fragility doesn't predict timing. It predicts what shape the system breaks in when it eventually breaks.

3. Why 2026 is structurally different from 1929 (the exit changes)

What's similar is the set-up. What's different is the exit. The exit changes everything about where capital ends up.

The implication: the next crisis doesn't transfer hegemony to the next single power. It transfers hegemony to a basket — RMB for energy and East Asia trade, EUR for European integration, INR-pegged baskets for South Asia and Africa, gold and crypto as neutral reserves. The dollar doesn't collapse. It demotes.

USD share of global FX reserves, 2000 → 2024

The slowest, most consequential trend nobody talks about
75% 68% 62% 56% 50% 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2024 71% 58%
Source: IMF COFER — Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves

4. The Manufacturing Reroute — already in motion

The "China +1" playbook isn't a thesis anymore. It's a budget line item at every major manufacturer. The data has stopped being controversial:

~14%
Of all iPhones now assembled in India (Q4 2024)
Bloomberg, Counterpoint Research
25%
Apple's stated target for India iPhone assembly by 2027
Apple supplier disclosures 2024
$71B
India FDI inflows in FY24 — record high
RBI, DPIIT 2024
25%
Target manufacturing share of Indian GDP by 2047 (from ~14% today)
Government of India / NITI Aayog
$10B+
Tata–PSMC semiconductor fab announced (Dholera) — India's first commercial logic fab
Tata Electronics, 2024
23%
India's electronics exports growth, FY24
Ministry of Commerce

The reroute isn't only about cost. It's about geopolitical hedging. Apple, Samsung, Foxconn, Micron, Tata, Vedanta, AMD — every name on this list has either announced or expanded India manufacturing in the last 24 months. The Production-Linked Incentive (PLI) scheme is now budgeted at ~₹1.97 lakh crore (~$23B) across 14 sectors. This is the largest industrial policy commitment India has made since 1991.

What the West routes to India during a reset:

This is not "India will manufacture more." This is "India already does, and the rate of capture is accelerating."


5. The Rupee's Hour — the case, the counter-case

This is the section where I have to be most careful, because the INR-appreciation thesis is the most contested part of the whole argument. Here's both sides, with numbers.

The Bull Case for INR
  • Trade surplus shift. Manufacturing exports growing 23% YoY. Services exports already at $325B+/year. Together they're closing the goods deficit.
  • Remittances cushion. $129B/year — largest in the world. This is structural, not cyclical.
  • Reserve growth. RBI now holds ~$675B in FX reserves — fourth-largest globally. Adds ~$50B/year.
  • De-dollarisation tailwind. 30+ countries now settle bilateral trade with India in INR or local currency. RBI's rupee-trade settlement mechanism active since 2023.
  • Capital inflows. India inclusion in JPMorgan EM bond index brought ~$30B passive inflows in 2024 alone. FTSE Russell inclusion now too.
  • Productivity differential. Real GDP growth ~6–7% vs US 1–2%. Long-run currency theory (Balassa-Samuelson) says faster productivity growth → currency appreciation.
The Bear Case for INR
  • Oil price shock. India imports 87% of its crude. A $20/barrel sustained spike adds ~$40B/year to the current account deficit.
  • RBI intervention bias. RBI has historically resisted INR appreciation to protect export competitiveness. Likely caps the rate of appreciation even if fundamentals support it.
  • Inflation differential. India CPI structurally ~3pp above US CPI. Purchasing-power parity arithmetic implies long-run depreciation against the dollar.
  • Capital flight risk. A global risk-off event would pull FII money out of India first. Saw this in 2008, 2013 taper tantrum, 2020.
  • Twin deficits. India still runs a current account deficit and fiscal deficit. A "twin-deficit" country structurally can't have a strong currency without external financing.
  • Geopolitical risk premium. India's neighbourhood (Pakistan, China, Bangladesh, Myanmar) attracts a risk premium that compresses currency valuation.

Both lists are factually correct. The argument isn't which is wrong; it's which dominates during a global financial reset. My take, with appropriate humility:


6. USD / INR scenarios by 2030

Three concrete scenarios for INR/USD in 2030, with the assumptions stated. Not a forecast. A scenario tree to think against:

ScenarioUSD/INR by 2030Key assumption
Bear / consensus90 – 100No reset event. Standard inflation-differential math. Rupee drifts down at ~2.5%/year.
Base case78 – 88Soft global slowdown, modest manufacturing capture, dollar share of reserves keeps drifting 1–1.5pp/year.
Bull / reset62 – 72US recession + dollar demotion + 25% INR overshoot during reserve rebalancing. India captures >25% of "China +1" manufacturing flows.

Probability weighting (my subjective view, not a forecast): Bear 45% / Base 35% / Bull 20%. Risk-adjusted expected value of INR is higher than the consensus prices in.

Even at 20% probability, the bull case is material enough that anyone hedging long-dollar exposure should be thinking about it. That's the real point of macro scenario analysis — not to predict, but to size optionality.


7. What's settled vs what's open

Sorting the certain from the contested:

Settled (high confidence, evidence-backed):

Open (genuine uncertainty):


8. So what — practical takeaways

I'm cautious about prescriptive recommendations, but if you read this and want to act on the framing:

None of this is a "buy India and you'll be rich" pitch. It is: the structural map of the next 10 years has India in a position it has not been in for 300 years. The asymmetry of being wrong (small drag) versus being right and unpositioned (large opportunity cost) is what makes the argument worth taking seriously even at moderate probability.

This piece is being expanded — adding sector deep-dives (energy, semis, defence), the climate-transition cost in INR terms, and quarterly tracking of the COFER + manufacturing data in subsequent updates. Counter-arguments welcome; the standard is data, not vibes.