I've wanted to write this for a while. Every political debate about India's two decades collapses into anecdote, WhatsApp forwards, and selective statistics. Both sides cherry-pick. Neither is wrong about their chosen numbers. Both are hiding inconvenient ones.
So I decided to do the boring, unflattering version: compile 201 data points across twelve categories, note the source for each, and let the numbers speak. Where one era was clearly stronger, I say so. Where data is disputed between government and independent sources, I show both. For metrics where % growth is misleading due to a low starting base, I compare absolute values and note it in the comments.
The two periods are made equal: 2003–2014 (11 years) corresponds to the UPA government under Prime Minister Manmohan Singh (who took office in May 2004; I use 2003 as the baseline year). 2014–2025 (11 years) corresponds to the NDA government under Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Anchor points: 2003 → 2014 → 2025. Both eras faced global shocks — UPA dealt with the 2008 GFC, NDA with COVID-19 in 2020. I note this where relevant and include a full G7 baseline comparison at the end.
This is not a verdict on which government was "better." That involves values, priorities, and trade-offs that numbers alone cannot resolve. This is a map of what changed, by how much, and in which direction.
How to read this:
- P1 Change = change from 2003 to 2014 (UPA era, 11 years). P2 Change = change from 2014 to 2025 (NDA era, 11 years).
- Sources linked inline; government and independent sources both cited where they differ.
- Where 2025 data is unavailable, latest actual year is shown and projection (if any) is clearly marked.
- All INR figures are nominal unless stated otherwise.
Verdict decision rules (applied consistently):
- NDA Stronger — NDA era delivered meaningfully better improvement OR avoided a UPA-era decline.
- UPA Stronger — UPA era delivered meaningfully better improvement OR the metric worsened under NDA. (Includes ex-"Declined" cases.)
- Mixed — assigned when ANY of the following apply:
- Data unavailable / projected — 2025 number is missing, significantly stale, or a long-horizon projection from earlier actual data.
- Base effect — the headline %-advantage of one era is mechanically driven by a smaller starting base AND the absolute change in both eras is similar (within ~1.5× of each other). When the absolute change in one era is 1.5× or more than the other, that era wins regardless of which era's % is higher.
- Ceiling / saturation → gap-closure test (rule upgraded Aug 2026) — for universal-coverage programs bounded at 100% (electrification, sanitation, immunization, banking access), eras are compared on the share of the remaining gap each closed (distance-to-frontier), not raw percentage points — taking 85% to 99.9% closes 99% of what was left and is harder than the percentage points suggest. One era wins only if it closed ≥1.5× the other's share; otherwise Mixed. The rule is not applied to consumer-adoption metrics with no universal target (TV, two-wheelers — substitution breaks the 100% ceiling) or biology-bound metrics (fertility).
- Similar magnitudes — both eras improved (or both declined) by roughly comparable absolute or pp changes (gap within ~20%).
- Methodology / measurement changed — the metric's denominator (country pool, survey methodology, classification) changed across years, making cross-era comparison non-comparable.
- External shock asymmetry — one era absorbed a shock the other didn't, and the gap is within shock-adjusted noise (e.g. COVID for P2, GFC for P1).
NDA Stronger — NDA era had better absolute or rate-of-change improvement
UPA Stronger — UPA era had better absolute or rate-of-change improvement (includes metrics that worsened under NDA)
Mixed — both eras moved the metric in the same direction and the apparent gap is meaningfully driven by base effects, saturation/ceilings, or external context (not policy quality)
Summary Scorecard
Verdicts across 201 data points (12 categories, equal 11-year windows, 2003–14 UPA vs 2014–25 NDA). Based on absolute improvement with explicit base-effect / saturation / data-availability adjustments. The full per-category breakdown follows below.
119
NDA Stronger
(NDA era led)
(NDA era led)
22
UPA Stronger
(UPA era led, incl. metrics that worsened under NDA)
(UPA era led, incl. metrics that worsened under NDA)
60
Mixed
(base effects / saturation / data unavailable / both same direction)
(base effects / saturation / data unavailable / both same direction)
A. Macroeconomics
| # | Metric | 2003 | 2014 | 2025/Latest | P1 Change (2003–14) | P2 Change (2014–25) | Verdict | Notes & Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Nominal GDP (USD billion) | $618B | $2,039B | $3,920B (FY26, new 2022-23 base series) | +230% (+$1,421B) | +92% (+$1,881B) | NDA Stronger | P1 % is higher due to the lower base ($618B). But in absolute dollars added, P2 added $2,231B vs P1's $1,421B — 57% more. Growing a $2T economy to $4.3T is a harder feat than $618B to $2T. Base effect favours P1 on %; absolute value favours P2. World Bank / IMF WEO Apr 2025 ⟳ Aug 2026 update: Major revision: MoSPI rebased GDP from 2011-12 to 2022-23 base (cuts nominal ~3.3%: FY26 Rs 345.5 trn vs Rs 357.1 trn old series) and the rupee fell ~11%, so FY26 nominal GDP is $3.92T, not $4.27T. Verdict holds — P2 absolute gain ($1,881B) still exceeds P1's ($1,421B) — but the margin narrows from 57% more to 32% more. · Business Standard — Govt to Parliament, Aug 2026 · Outlook Business — base-year revision explained |
| 2 | GDP PPP (USD billion, current intl $) | $2,020B | $7,100B | $18,900B (2026, IMF) | +251% (+$5,080B) | +166% (+$11,800B) | NDA Stronger | P2 added $9,500B in PPP wealth vs P1's $5,080B — nearly double in absolute terms. India passed Japan and Germany on PPP during P2. Base effect: P1 had higher % from a lower base ($2T); absolute tells a different story. IMF WEO Apr 2025 ⟳ Aug 2026 update: IMF (via Worldometer aggregation of WEO data) puts India PPP GDP at $18.90T for 2026, up from the $16.6T shown. PPP is largely insulated from the rupee slide. Verdict strengthens: P2 absolute PPP addition now ~$11.8T vs P1's $5.1T. · Worldometer — GDP PPP by country 2026 (IMF) · IMF WEO Datamapper Apr 2026 |
| 3 | Average Annual GDP Growth Rate (%) | — | — | — | 7.9% avg (11 yrs) | 5.9% avg (11 yrs) | Mixed | Verdict revised to Mixed on base-effect grounds. Headline P1 7.9% vs P2 5.9% (incl. COVID) or P2 ~7.1% (ex-COVID FY21). The base sizes are not comparable: growing a $618B economy at 7.9% (P1) is mechanically easier than growing a $2T economy at 7%+ (P2 ex-COVID). P1 also rode global EM tailwinds (commodity supercycle, pre-GFC capital abundance); P2 absorbed three distinct shocks (demonetisation, GST transition, COVID). Ex-COVID the gap is only ~0.8pp — within the noise of any cross-period growth-rate comparison. A clean "X stronger" verdict on growth rate alone over-reads the data; absolute output added is captured in metrics #1 and #2. World Bank / MoSPI ⟳ Aug 2026 update: Flag only: the new 2022-23 base series revised recent real growth UP (FY26 revised to ~7.6%), which nudges the P2 ex-COVID average slightly higher and further supports the Mixed verdict. No numeric change made because the P1/P2 averages need full-series recomputation on the new base once MoSPI backcasts it. · New GDP series — FY26 growth revised to 7.6% |
| 4 | Per Capita GDP — Nominal (USD) | $556 | $1,576 | $2,813 (2026, IMF) | +183% (+$1,020) | +78% (+$1,237) | NDA Stronger | P1 % is higher due to base effect ($556 start). But P2 added more absolute dollars ($1,364 vs $1,020) from a harder base. Growing per capita from $556→$1,576 benefits from low-base tailwinds; $1,576→$2,940 requires real productivity gains at scale (1.4B population). P2 wins on absolute and difficulty-adjusted basis. World Bank ⟳ Aug 2026 update: Rebasing plus rupee depreciation cut the latest per-capita figure from the published $2,940 to $2,813 (IMF, 2026). Verdict holds on absolute gain ($1,237 vs $1,020) but the margin is now thin — worth softening the note's language. · Worldometer — India GDP/per capita (IMF) · Worldometer — GDP per capita 2026 (IMF) |
| 5 | Per Capita GDP — PPP (intl $) | $2,000 | $5,450 | $12,964 (2026, IMF) | +173% (+$3,450) | +138% (+$7,514) | NDA Stronger | P2 added $5,550 in PPP per capita vs P1's $3,450 — 61% more in absolute terms. Same base-effect logic: % looks better in P1 because it starts from $2,000. What actually improved living standards faster is the absolute gain. IMF WEO Apr 2025 ⟳ Aug 2026 update: Latest IMF figure is $12,964 (2026) vs the published $11,000 estimate. Verdict strengthens: P2 absolute PPP per-capita gain ~$7,514 vs P1's $3,450. · Worldometer — GDP per capita PPP 2026 (IMF) |
| 6 | Global GDP Rank (nominal) | 13th | 10th | 6th (2026) | +3 ranks | +4 ranks | NDA Stronger | Passed France (2019), UK (2022). On track to pass Japan by ~2030. IMF ⟳ Aug 2026 update: India SLIPPED from 5th to 6th in 2026 — Japan and the UK moved back ahead after the 2022-23 base-year revision (~-3.3% nominal) and an ~11% rupee fall. Government confirmed 6th rank ($3.92T) in Parliament, Aug 2026. Verdict stays NDA Stronger (+4 ranks vs +3) but the notes need rewriting: the 'passed UK in 2022' framing has reversed for now; IMF projects India re-passing UK and Japan by ~2027 and 3rd place by ~2031. · Indian Express (via Vision IAS) — how India slid to 6th · Business Standard — Govt to Parliament, Aug 2026 |
| 7 | CPI Inflation — Annual Average (%) | ~3.8% | ~9.4% | ~2.1% (CY2025 avg) | +6.2pp (worse) | −7.3pp (better) | NDA Stronger | UPA era saw double-digit inflation (2009–14 avg ~9.5%). NDA period averaged ~5.5%, with RBI inflation targeting framework adopted 2016. RBI / World Bank ⟳ Aug 2026 update: CY2025 average CPI collapsed to 2.09% — a multi-decade low (food deflation) — vs the published ~4.8%. Note CPI ticked back to ~4.4% by Jul 2026, worth a caveat. Also v2014 '~10.0%' overstates: FY2013-14 average was ~9.4% (CY2014 was already ~6.4%). Verdict NDA Stronger strengthens materially. · Statista — India average inflation 2025 · Trading Economics — India CPI (Jul 2026: 4.45%) |
| 8 | Foreign Exchange Reserves (USD billion) | $99B | $304B | $717B (Aug 2026) | +207% (+$205B) | +136% (+$413B) | NDA Stronger | P2 added more absolute reserves ($336B vs $205B) from a much harder base. India is now 4th largest Forex holder globally. Peak hit $704B in Sept 2024. Base effect: P1 had higher % from $99B start. RBI Weekly Statistical Supplement ⟳ Aug 2026 update: Reserves hit $716.9B in the week ended Aug 14, 2026, after crossing $700B and touching a record ~$728B — well above the published $640B. Update the 'peak $704B Sept 2024' line. Verdict NDA Stronger strengthens. · RBI weekly data — $716.9B, Aug 14 2026 · Akashvani — record high $728B |
| 9 | FDI Inflows — Annual (USD billion) | $4.7B | $36.0B | $94.5B gross (FY26) | +636% (+$30B) | +162% (+$58.5B) | Mixed | Both on % and absolute terms, P1 wins — FDI added $30B in P1 vs $20B in P2. FDI has been declining from a peak of $85B (FY22) to ~$55B (FY25 est.), a concerning trend. P1 created India's FDI credibility. DPIIT ⟳ Aug 2026 update: The published $55B mixed up series and is badly stale: FY26 gross total FDI was $94.52B (equity $58.85B), up from $81B in FY25. On the same DPIIT gross-total series, FY14 was ~$36.0B (not $34.6B). Note rewrite required — FDI set a record, it did not decline. · DPIIT via India Briefing — FY26 FDI · IBEF — FY26 gross FDI $94.52B / equity $58.84B |
| 10 | Merchandise Exports (USD billion) | $63B | $317B | $442B (FY26) | +403% (+$254B) | +39% (+$125B) | UPA Stronger | P1 wins on both % and absolute — added $254B vs P2's $133B. Merchandise growth stalled post-2014 due to global trade slowdown and China competition. FY25 target: $500B not met. DGFT ⟳ Aug 2026 update: FY2025-26 actual: $441.8B (+0.9% YoY, Dept of Commerce). Marginal upgrade from $450B estimate — actually slightly LOWER than the published estimate; near-flat growth confirms the stagnation story. Verdict UPA Stronger holds. · PIB — FY26 trade data · BW — FY26 exports $863.1B total |
| 11 | Services Exports (USD billion) | $38B | $155B | $421B (FY26) | +308% (+$117B) | +172% (+$266B) | NDA Stronger | P2 added $225B in absolute services exports vs P1's $117B — nearly double. GCC (Global Capability Center) boom drove P2 growth — India now hosts 1,700+ GCCs. Base effect: P1 had higher % from $38B. NASSCOM / RBI ⟳ Aug 2026 update: FY2025-26 actual: $421.3B (+8.7% YoY; FY25 was $387.6B). Services now nearly equal merchandise exports ($442B) — a striking crossover worth adding to the note. Verdict NDA Stronger strengthens. · PIB — FY26 trade data · FY26 services exports $421.32B |
| 12 | Central Fiscal Deficit (% of GDP) | ~4.3% | 4.5% | 4.8% (FY25 actual; FY26 target 4.4%) | Widened 0.4pp | Widened 0.3pp | Mixed | UPA failed to consolidate; NDA fared worse on this metric. COVID FY21 spike (9.2%) distorts; pre-COVID FY20 was 3.5% (best in decades). Target: 4.5% by FY26. MoF Union Budget ⟳ Aug 2026 update: Published 5.6% was FY24 — two years stale. FY25 actual came in at 4.77% (beat the 4.84% RE); DEA says FY26's 4.4% target is on track. Also v2003: FY2003-04 deficit is usually cited at ~4.3-4.5%, not 4.1% (series-dependent) — worth footnoting. · Business Standard — FY25 actual 4.77% · DEA — FY26 4.4% on track |
| 13 | Tax-to-GDP Ratio (%) | 9.2% | 10.1% | 12.0% | +0.9pp | +1.9pp | NDA Stronger | GST implementation (2017), expanded tax base, UPI trails helping formalization. MoF |
| 14 | Direct Tax Collections (INR lakh crore) | ₹1.05L cr | ₹6.39L cr | ₹23.4L cr (FY26) | +703% (+₹2.6L cr) | +266% (+₹17.0L cr) | NDA Stronger | P2 added ₹19.5L cr in absolute direct tax revenue vs P1's ₹2.6L cr — 7.5× more in absolute terms. Base effect explains why P1's % is slightly higher despite adding far less money; it does not explain away an absolute gap of this magnitude. ITR filers grew from ~30M (2003) to ~90M (2025). GST + UPI trails + faceless assessment + PAN-Aadhaar linking drove structural formalization. Cross-validates with Tax-to-GDP (#13, #16). CBDT Annual Reports ⟳ Aug 2026 update: SERIOUS DATA ERRORS in baselines: CBDT time-series shows FY2003-04 = ₹1,05,088 cr (not ₹0.37L cr, which is late-1990s) and FY2013-14 = ₹6,38,596 cr (not ₹2.97L cr, which is ~FY08). FY26 net collections: ₹23.40L cr (+5.1%, missed RE). Corrected P1 change: +508% (+₹5.3L cr). Verdict NDA Stronger survives on absolute (₹17.0L cr vs ₹5.3L cr) but the note's claim that P1's % is only 'slightly higher' is now false (508% vs 266%) — rewrite required. · Income Tax Dept — time series FY2000-01 to 2024-25 · CBDT — FY26 net ₹23.40L cr |
| 15 | BSE Sensex (year-end, index level) | 5,839 | 27,499 | 85,221 (Dec 31, 2025) | +371% (+21,660 pts) | +210% (+57,722 pts) | Mixed | Verdict revised to Mixed on base-effect grounds. Stock indices compound multiplicatively — absolute pts gained mechanically scales with starting base. P1 had higher %-return (371% vs 187%) from a smaller base; P2 had higher absolute pts gained from a much larger base. Neither comparison cleanly attributes to policy quality — equity returns reflect global liquidity, earnings cycles, and FII flows as much as domestic policy. The genuine structural story under P2 (SIP inflows, retail participation deepening, demat account growth) is real and is captured better by the IT/Software (#45), Services Exports (#11), and Unicorn (#46) metrics. BSE India ⟳ Aug 2026 update: 2025 closed at 85,220.60 (+9.1% for the year) vs the published ~79,000 estimate. Verdict stays Mixed per the row's own base-effect logic. · Dec 31, 2025 close: Sensex 85,220.60 |
| 17 | Current Account Balance (% of GDP) | −0.1% | −1.7% | −0.6% (FY26) | −1.6pp (worsened) | +1.1pp (improved) | NDA Stronger | Verdict based on absolute change: P1 worsened deficit by 1.6pp of GDP; P2 improved by 0.6pp. India hit a CAD crisis in 2013 (rupee fell 15–20% in months). NDA maintained steadier external balance through commodity cycle. Note: both eras ran a deficit — the direction of change decides verdict. RBI Balance of Payments Data ⟳ Aug 2026 update: FY2025-26 CAD was $25.2B = 0.6% of GDP (unchanged vs FY25's 0.6%), with Q4 FY26 actually in surplus (+$7.1B, 0.7% of GDP). Published −1.1% was FY24. Verdict NDA Stronger strengthens: P2 improvement is now +1.1pp, not +0.6pp. · RBI via Business Standard — Q4 FY26 / full-year CAD |
| 18 | External Debt (% of GDP) | ~21.1% | ~23.5% | 20.8% (end-Mar 2026) | +2.4pp (worsened) | −2.7pp (improved) | NDA Stronger | Verdict based on absolute pp change: P1 increased external vulnerability by 2.4pp; P2 reduced it by 4.5pp. Lower external debt/GDP = less exposure to currency/global rate shocks. P2 benefitted from higher nominal GDP growth reducing the ratio, plus disciplined ECB policy. RBI India's External Debt ⟳ Aug 2026 update: RBI: external debt $762.8B = 20.8% of GDP at end-March 2026, up from 19.8% a year earlier (rise driven by rupee depreciation and the smaller rebased GDP denominator, plus corporate borrowing). Verdict NDA Stronger holds but the improvement margin halves (−2.7pp vs the published −4.5pp); debt service ratio improved to 5.8% of current receipts. · RBI via Business Standard — 20.8% end-Mar 2026 · RBI — external debt $762.8B FY26 |
| NEW | General Government Debt (% of GDP) | 84.3% | 67.1% | 84.1% (2025) | −17.2pp (improved) | +17.0pp (worsened) | UPA Stronger | The cleanest fiscal-health mirror image in the dataset: P1 cut combined centre+state debt from 84.3% to a series-low 67.1% of GDP (high nominal growth eroding the ratio); P2 rode it back to 84.1% — COVID borrowing (peak ~89% FY21) plus the smaller rebased GDP denominator. No base-effect ambiguity here: percentage points of GDP are directly comparable across eras. IMF WEO Datamapper — general govt gross debt / Trading Economics — India govt debt/GDP / World Economics — India debt/GDP history |
| NEW | Inward Remittances (USD billion, annual) | $21B | $70B | $135B (FY25) | +236% (+$49B) | +92% (+$65B) | NDA Stronger | India has been the world's No. 1 remittance recipient throughout both eras; FY25's $135.4B (+14% YoY) is roughly Mexico + China combined. Familiar base-effect split — P1's % is higher from a $21B base, P2 added more absolute dollars (+$65B vs +$49B) — but the P2 story is also qualitative: the mix shifted from Gulf blue-collar wages toward US/UK white-collar earnings, a higher-quality flow. PIB/RBI — FY25 remittances $135.4B / World Bank — remittance flows (India $129B in 2024) |
| NEW | Listed Equity Market Cap (USD trillion) | ~$0.28T | ~$1.6T | ~$5.0T (mid-2026) | +471% (+$1.3T) | +213% (+$3.4T) | Mixed | BSE-listed market cap crossed $1T in 2007 (P1), then $2T (2017), $3T (2021), $4T (2023) and $5T (2024) under P2; it has oscillated between ~$4.8T and ~$5.3T through 2026 on the rupee slide and FII outflows. Same verdict logic as the Sensex row: market cap compounds multiplicatively and tracks global liquidity as much as policy, so % favours P1's base and absolute favours P2 — Mixed, with the genuine P2 structural story (IPO/listing breadth, retail SIP deepening) noted rather than over-claimed. Business Standard — $5T milestone & history / CEIC — India market cap ($5.10T Jul 2026) / BSE mcap re-crosses $5T, Jun 2026 |
| NEW | INR/USD Exchange Rate (₹ per $, annual avg) | ₹46.6 | ₹61.0 | ₹95.8 (Aug 2026) | −31% rupee depreciation (+₹14.4) | −57% rupee depreciation (+₹34.8) | UPA Stronger | The rupee lost ₹14.4/$ over P1 (including the 2013 taper-tantrum crash that P1 is remembered for) but ₹34.8/$ over P2, with an accelerating slide — down ~9.7% in the 12 months to Aug 2026 alone (₹90.7 in Feb 2026 to ₹95.8 in Aug 2026). This single series explains most of the nominal-GDP rank slip to 6th. Caveat for the notes: some depreciation is deliberate REER management for export competitiveness, and P2's larger absolute fall is partly mechanical from the higher starting level — but even in % terms P2 depreciated faster. Trading Economics — USD/INR 95.76, Aug 20 2026 / USD/INR 2026 history / FRED — INR/USD historical (2003, 2014 averages) |
A. Macroeconomics — Section Score (21 metrics)
13
NDA ↑
3
UPA ↑
2
Mixed
B. Roads & Transport Infrastructure
| # | Metric | 2003 | 2014 | 2025/Latest | P1 Change (2003–14) | P2 Change (2014–25) | Verdict | Notes & Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 16 | National Highways — Total Length (km) | 65,569 | 91,287 | 1,46,560 | +39% (+25,718 km) | +61% (+55,273 km) | Mixed | Verdict revised to Mixed on methodology-change grounds. 2015 NH reclassification added ~28,000 km of former state highways to the NH network on paper. Adjusted for the reclassification: P2 organic new-build ≈ 26,000 km vs P1's 25,718 km — functionally tied. Real construction acceleration shows up cleanly in row #17 (NH Construction Rate km/day), where NDA wins decisively without measurement artefacts. NHAI / MoRTH ⟳ Aug 2026 update: Published 1,45,155 was a mid-2025 estimate; MoRTH now reports 1,46,195 km at end-2024 and 1,46,560 km in 2025. Verdict stays Mixed (reclassification caveat still applies). · DD News / MoRTH · PIB Year End Review 2024 — MoRTH |
| 17 | NH Construction Rate (km/day avg) | ~7 | ~10 | ~29 | +43% | +190% | NDA Stronger | Peak: 37 km/day in FY22. This is actual construction, not reclassification. A genuine acceleration with no base-effect caveat. NHAI Annual Reports ⟳ Aug 2026 update: Published ~33 was the FY24 pace (12,349 km = 33.8/day). FY25 actual: 10,660 km = ~29.2 km/day; ICRA projects 9,500-10,000 km (~26-27/day) for FY26. Still ~3x the 2014 pace — verdict unchanged, but the latest actual is lower than published. · Tribune — MoRTH FY25 construction · ICRA road execution FY26 |
| 18 | 4-Lane+ Highways (km) | ~8,500 | 18,371 | 43,512 | +116% | +137% (+25,141 km) | NDA Stronger | NHAI ⟳ Aug 2026 update: Published 44,654 appears overstated — MoRTH's own March 2026 statement puts 4-lane+ NH (incl. access-controlled) at 43,512 km, from 18,371 km in 2014. Corrected downward to the official figure; verdict unchanged. · MoRTH statement (Mar 2026) |
| 19 | Expressways (km, operational) | ~185 | ~1,208 | ~7,300 | +553% (+1,023 km) | +504% (+6,092 km) | NDA Stronger | P1 % is misleading — it started near zero. What matters is absolute km built: P2 added 3,292 km vs P1's 1,023 km — over 3x more. Expressway network built in P2 include Purvanchal, Delhi-Mumbai, Agra-Lucknow, Yamuna, Bundelkhand. Clear P2 win. NHAI ⟳ Aug 2026 update: Big jump vs published ~4,500: as of April 2026 total operational expressways ~7,332 km (Wikipedia compilation; a late-2024 count was ~6,059 km). Caveat: MoRTH's own narrower series (access-controlled high-speed corridors only) reads 93 km (2014) to 3,052 km (end-2025) — definitions vary widely, hence medium confidence. Either series strengthens the NDA verdict. · Expressways of India (Apr 2026) · MoRTH high-speed corridor series |
| 20 | PMGSY Rural Roads — Cumulative km Built | ~1.8L km | ~4.3L km | ~7.9L km | +139% (+2.5L km) | +83% (+3.6L km) | NDA Stronger | P2 built 3.7 lakh km vs P1's 2.5 lakh km — 1.5× more in absolute terms, on harder last-mile habitations (the remaining unconnected villages by 2014 were the structurally hardest). UPA launched PMGSY and deserves credit for the framework; NDA delivered the larger physical buildout. PMGSY Portal / MoRD ⟳ Aug 2026 update: Published ~8.0L was slightly ahead of actuals: PIB (Dec 2025, PMGSY 25th anniversary) reports 7,87,520 km completed of 8,25,114 km sanctioned. Minor downward correction; verdict unchanged. · PIB — 25 Years of PMGSY (Dec 2025) |
| 21 | % Eligible Habitations Connected (Rural) | ~37% | ~70% | ~99% | +33pp | +29pp | NDA Stronger | Pp gain looks similar (33 vs 29) but the last 30% of habitations are the hardest — remote, hilly, tribal areas. Connecting 37%→70% is structurally easier than 70%→99%. P2 completed what P1 could not. PMGSY |
| 22 | Railway Route km (total) | 63,465 | 65,808 | ~69,181 | +3.7% | +5.1% | Mixed | New route additions have been slow in both eras (~2–3% per decade). Focus has shifted to capacity/electrification over new lines. Indian Railways Annual Stat Summary ⟳ Aug 2026 update: Published 68,043 was FY23-era; FY24 route km was 68,584 and 2025 network is ~69,181 km. Still slow growth in both eras — verdict stays Mixed. · IBEF Railways (FY24: 68,584 km) · India Data Map 2025 (69,181 km) |
| 23 | Railway Electrification (km of BG routes) | ~16,000 | ~21,801 | ~69,427 | +39% | +218% (+47,626 km) | NDA Stronger | Mission 100% electrification declared 2017; 90%+ achieved by 2024. Saves ~₹14,000 crore/yr in diesel costs. Ministry of Railways ⟳ Aug 2026 update: Published ~61,500 is stale: 69,427 RKM of the 70,001 RKM broad-gauge network electrified as of Nov 2025 (99.2%). PIB puts pre-2014 cumulative electrification at 21,801 km (published 22,224 slightly high). 46,900 km added 2014-2025 — more than double the previous six decades combined. · PIB — 99.2% BG electrification · PIB — Mission 100% Electrification |
| 24 | Vande Bharat Trains (semi-HSR, 160 km/h) | 0 | 0 | ~164 services | — | New fleet | NDA Stronger | Designed and manufactured in India. First run: Feb 2019. 130+ trains operational by 2024. Ministry of Railways ⟳ Aug 2026 update: Published '100+' now stale: 162 chair-car + 2 sleeper services in operation as of July 2026 (first sleeper service began Jan 2026). Caveat: 'services' are counted as train pairs/runs — trainset count is lower; recommend stating the unit as services. · RailMitra Vande Bharat guide (Jul 2026) |
| 25 | High Speed Rail (350 km/h, km operational) | 0 | 0 | 0 | — | — | No Change | Neither era built HSR — both start and end at 0 km operational. Not a decline, just no progress. Mumbai–Ahmedabad HSR (508 km, ₹1.08 lakh crore, JICA-funded) was announced in 2017 and is under construction; target revised to 2026–27. NHSRCL |
| 26 | Metro Rail — Cities Operational | 1 | 5 | 24 | +4 cities | +19 cities | NDA Stronger | MoHUA Metro Rail Policy ⟳ Aug 2026 update: Published 21 now stale: MoHUA-based reporting (2026) counts ~1,090 km in commercial operation across 24 cities (26 cities / 1,159 km if Namo Bharat RRTS is included). · Metro Rail Today / MoHUA |
| 27 | Metro Rail — Total km Operational | 65 | 362 | ~1,090 | +457% (+297 km) | +201% (+728 km) | NDA Stronger | P1 had higher % from a tiny base (65 km). P2 added 638 km in absolute terms vs P1's 297 km — more than double. P2 also expanded to 20 new cities; P1 was mainly Delhi. MoHUA ⟳ Aug 2026 update: Network crossed 1,000 km in May 2025; ~1,090 km operational across 24 cities as of 2026 (1,159 km incl. Delhi-Meerut RRTS). P2 absolute add now +728 km vs P1's +297 km. · Metro Rail Today / MoHUA · MoHUA 2025 milestones |
| 28 | Operational Airports | 61 | 74 | ~160 | +23% | +116% | NDA Stronger | UDAN regional connectivity scheme launched 2016 drove tier-2/tier-3 airport expansion. AAI / MoCA ⟳ Aug 2026 update: Published 150 stale: Civil Aviation Ministry cites 160 operational airports (PIB's Modified UDAN doc says 165 as of 15 Jul 2026). Official 2014 baseline is 74, not 75 — minor fix. · NewsOnAir — MoCA · PIB — Modified UDAN (Jul 2026) |
| 29 | Air Passengers — Domestic (million/yr) | ~40M | ~61M | ~168M (FY26) | +53% (+21M) | +175% (+107M) | NDA Stronger | P2 added 99M annual passengers vs P1's 21M — 4.7× more in absolute terms. India became the world's 3rd-largest domestic aviation market. LCCs drove much of this demand-side, but UDAN regional connectivity (2016) plus airport expansion (75 → 150 operational) were the supply-side policy enablers. Both demand and policy contributed; the era differential is too large to wash out as exogenous. DGCA ⟳ Aug 2026 update: Actuals now in: FY2024-25 domestic traffic 165.7M; FY2025-26 reached 167.7M (+1.4% YoY — growth is flattening, but the era total rises vs the published ~160M estimate). · FY26 domestic pax (167.7M) · ICRA / Business Standard |
| 30 | Registered Vehicles (millions, cumulative) | ~57M | ~185M | ~380M | +225% (+128M) | +105% (+195M) | NDA Stronger | P2 added 195M vehicles vs P1's 128M — 1.5× more in absolute terms. Both eras benefited from rising aspirational class and cheaper credit (exogenous drivers); P2 delivered the larger absolute expansion regardless. Accident-rate per vehicle data (#31) is the cleaner safety-policy metric. VAHAN Dashboard / MoRTH ⟳ Aug 2026 review: Could not verify the ~380M cumulative figure against a current official total — Vahan reports flows (28.2M new registrations in CY2025), and the last official stock figure found is the Road Transport Yearbook's 326M (as of Mar 2020). ~380-400M by 2025 is plausible via accumulation but unverified; keep value, flag as estimate. |
| 31 | Road Accident Fatalities (annual) | ~83,000 | ~1,40,000 | 1,72,890 (2023) | +69% | +23% | NDA Stronger | Absolute deaths rose +20% under NDA vs +69% under UPA, on a vehicle fleet that grew far faster. Deaths per 1 lakh registered vehicles fell from ~57 (2014) to ~38 (2024) — a ~33% improvement. Deaths per 1 lakh population also declined. Fairer metric: NDA reduced accident rate meaningfully despite more roads and far more vehicles. MoRTH Road Accidents Report ⟳ Aug 2026 update: MoRTH 'Road Accidents in India 2023' (released Aug 2025) reports 1,72,890 deaths — highest ever, +2.6% over 2022. Replaces the 2022 figure. The rate-based NDA Stronger argument (deaths per lakh vehicles falling) still holds, but absolute deaths continue to climb — worth keeping the nuance in the note. · MoRTH Road Accidents 2023 report |
| 32 | Railway Electrification (% of total route km) | ~23% | ~36% | ~99.6% of BG (2026) | +13pp | +64pp | NDA Stronger | Verdict based on absolute pp added: P2 +64pp vs P1 +13pp — decisively NDA. India completed 100% railway electrification of broad-gauge routes by Dec 2023, eliminating diesel traction (~₹16,000 Cr/year fuel saving). This was a stated NDA Mission Electrification target. UPA laid groundwork but scale-up was overwhelmingly P2. Ministry of Railways Annual Report ⟳ Aug 2026 update: CORRECTION: the published claim '100% (Dec 2023)' is wrong — 100% was a target, not an achievement. Actual: 99.2% of broad-gauge network electrified by Nov 2025 (69,427 of 70,001 RKM), 99.6% reported in 2026; 5 states still have residual diesel sections. Verdict unchanged (still +64pp under NDA vs +13pp under UPA), but the cell text and note must drop the Dec 2023 claim. · PIB — 99.2% BG electrified (Nov 2025) · NewsOnAir — 99.6% (2026) |
| 33 | Major Port Cargo Throughput (million tonnes, annual) | 313.5 MT (FY03) | 555.5 MT (FY14) | 915 MT (FY26) | +537 MT | +360 MT (+65%) | NDA Stronger | Verdict based on absolute MT added: P2 +749 MT vs P1 +537 MT. Sagarmala Programme (2016) targeted port-led industrialization — modernization, new berths, rail connectivity to hinterland. Capacity utilization improved; turnaround time fell from ~4 days (2014) to ~0.9 days (2024). Sagarmala / MoPSW ⟳ Aug 2026 update: SERIES FIX: published row mixed two series — 314 MT (2003) is MAJOR ports, but 851 MT (2014) matches neither major ports (555.5 MT, MOSPI yearbook) nor all ports (972.5 MT), and 1,600 MT (FY24) is ALL ports. Restated consistently on major ports: 313.5 (FY03) → 555.5 (FY14) → 915.2 (FY26, record, +7% YoY). Verdict holds on absolute adds (P2 +360 MT vs P1 +242 MT) but the gap is far narrower than published (+749 vs +537), and P1 wins on % growth (+77% vs +65%) — an honest note could call this closer to Mixed. Also fix the note's turnaround claim: official FY26 avg vessel TRT is 48.84 hrs (~2 days), not 0.9 days. · MOSPI Statistical Yearbook — Shipping (FY03/FY14 series) · IBEF — Major ports 915 MT FY26 · TRT 48.84 hrs FY26 |
| 34 | Logistics Performance Index — Score (World Bank, 1–5) | 3.07 (2007)Rank 39/150 (26th %ile) | 3.08 (2014)Rank 54/160 (34th %ile) | 3.41 (2023)Rank 38/139 (27th %ile) | Score +0.01 (flat); %ile 26→34 (worsened) | Score +0.33; %ile 34→27 (improved) | NDA Stronger | Verdict based on LPI score (comparable across years) AND percentile-adjusted rank. UPA left logistics score flat and percentile worsened (26th→34th). NDA improved score by +0.33 and recovered to 27th percentile — Sagarmala, PM Gati Shakti (multimodal logistics), NLP 2022 drove gains. India target: top 25 in LPI by 2030. World Bank LPI |
| NEW | Dedicated Freight Corridors — km Operational | 0 | 0 | 2,843 (Mar 2026) | 0 km commissioned | +2,843 km (full network) | NDA Stronger | UPA sanctioned the DFC programme (2006) and began land acquisition — the framework credit is P1's. But zero km were operational by 2014; the entire 2,843 km (Eastern DFC 1,337 km fully operational 2023; Western DFC 1,506 km completed 31 Mar 2026) was commissioned under P2. Same pattern as PMGSY in reverse: one era designs, the other delivers — here the delivery gap is total. Western DFC / Eastern DFC / DFC updates 2026 / DFCCIL |
| NEW | Major Ports — Avg Vessel Turnaround Time (days) | ~3.6 (FY06) | 3.84 (FY14) | 2.04 (FY26) | Worsened then recovered (~flat; peaked 5.29 in FY11) | -47% | NDA Stronger | The cleanest port-efficiency metric — immune to cargo-mix base effects. Under P1, TRT actually deteriorated (3.63 days FY06 → 5.29 FY11) before recovering to 3.84 by FY14 — net zero improvement over the era. P2 nearly halved it to 48.84 hours by FY26 via mechanisation, digitisation and berth optimisation. Caveat: earliest comparable MOSPI datapoint is FY06, not FY04, so the P1 baseline is a near-proxy. MOSPI Yearbook — TRT series FY91-FY15 / FY26 TRT 48.84 hrs |
| NEW | FASTag Electronic Toll Collection (₹ crore/yr) | 0 | 0 (pilot launched FY15) | ₹70,278 Cr (FY26) | — (did not exist) | 0 → ₹70,278 Cr; ~98% ETC penetration | NDA Stronger | A from-zero digitisation metric, so no base-effect debate — the entire electronic tolling stack was built in P2. FASTag collections hit ₹70,278 Cr in FY26 (+14.4% YoY) with ~98% of toll revenue now electronic and 5.9 Cr active tags; total toll collection was ₹82,900 Cr. Fair caveat: rising collections also reflect more tolled km and higher rates, not just efficiency. FASTag FY26 collections / ETC penetration 98% |
| NEW | EV Share of New Vehicle Registrations (%) | 0% | ~0% (e-4W: 580 units) | 8% (2.3M EVs, CY2025) | ~0pp | +8pp (0 → 2.3M units/yr) | NDA Stronger | EVs were a rounding error in both 2003 and 2014 (580 electric cars registered in all of 2014, per NITI Aayog/Vahan), so this is a pure P2 story: FAME-I/II and PM E-DRIVE took annual EV registrations to 2.3 million in CY2025 — 8% of all new registrations, led by 2W (57%) and 3W (35%). Percentage-share framing keeps it chartable and avoids the absurd infinite-growth % of a zero base. IBEF / Vahan — EV 8% share CY2025 / NITI Aayog EV report (2014 baseline) |
B. Roads & Transport — Section Score (23 metrics)
20
NDA ↑
0
UPA ↑
3
Mixed
C. Energy & Power
| # | Metric | 2003 | 2014 | 2025/Latest | P1 Change (2003–14) | P2 Change (2014–25) | Verdict | Notes & Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 32 | Total Installed Power Capacity (GW) | 107 | 250 | 552 (Jul 2026) | +134% (+143 GW) | +121% (+302 GW) | NDA Stronger | P2 added 250 GW vs P1's 143 GW in absolute terms. P2 also shifted the mix — renewable went from ~5% to ~25% of installed capacity. Base effect: P1 had higher % from 107 GW base. CEA (Central Electricity Authority) ⟳ Aug 2026 update: Actual capacity is now 552 GW (Jul 31, 2026, PIB) vs the published ~500 estimate; crossed 500 GW in late 2025. v2003 (107) and v2014 (250; PIB cites 249) check out. · PIB — India's Power Sector (Jul 2026) · Hans India — 552 GW |
| 33 | Solar Energy Installed Capacity (GW) | ~0.01 | 2.8 | 164.6 (Jul 2026) | Nascent | +5,779% | NDA Stronger | India became world's 3rd largest solar market. Target: 500 GW renewable by 2030. This is a genuine P2 achievement — solar barely existed in P1. MNRE ⟳ Aug 2026 update: Published ~90 was stale even in mid-2025 (actual ~110 GW then); record FY26 additions (+44.6 GW solar) took it to 164.59 GW by Jul 31, 2026. v2014 fixed 2.6 -> 2.8 GW per PIB/MNRE (2.82 GW, Mar 2014). Verdict unchanged, dramatically strengthened. · PIB — solar 164.59 GW, Jul 2026 · JMK Research — FY26 record additions |
| 34 | Wind Energy Installed Capacity (GW) | ~4.4 | ~21 | 57.4 (Jun 2026) | +400% (+17.6 GW) | +173% (+36 GW) | NDA Stronger | P2 added 24 GW of wind capacity vs P1's 17.6 GW — 1.4× more in absolute terms. P1's headline % advantage is base-effect-driven (started at only 4.4 GW). P2 focus shifted heavily to solar (which is cheaper), so wind growth as a share decelerated — but more GW of wind were nonetheless added. MNRE ⟳ Aug 2026 update: MNRE-reported wind capacity is 57.44 GW as of Jun 30, 2026 (published ~46 was ~Nov-2024 vintage). v2014 fixed ~22 -> ~21 (21.04 GW, Mar 2014). P1 change becomes +377% (+16.6 GW); P2 absolute lead widens to ~2.2x. · MNRE via Sarkaritel — wind 57.44 GW, Jun 2026 · JMK Research — 6 GW wind added FY26 |
| 35 | Renewable Energy % of Total Power Gen | ~26% (mainly hydro) | ~30% | ~53% of installed capacity (Jun 2026) | +1pp | +23pp | NDA Stronger | Non-hydro renewable: 2014 ~5%, 2024 ~25% — a structural shift. CEA ⟳ Aug 2026 update: FLAG: row is mislabeled — these values are share of installed CAPACITY, not generation (non-fossil generation share is only ~25%). Recommend renaming to 'RE % of Installed Capacity'. RE incl. large hydro = 288.6 of 548.9 GW = ~53% (Jun 2026); non-fossil incl. nuclear = 300.5 GW = 54% (Jul 2026). Milestone: non-fossil crossed 50% in Jul 2025, five years ahead of the NDC target. v2003 corrected: hydro+RES was ~28.5 of 108 GW = ~26%, not 29%. Verdict unchanged. · PIB — non-fossil 300.5 GW / 54%, Jul 2026 · PIB — RE capacity 288.58 GW, Jun 2026 |
| 36 | Household Electrification (%) | ~65% (World Bank, population access) | ~85% (World Bank, population access) | ~99.9% | +20pp | +15pp (to ~100%) | NDA Stronger | Saubhagya scheme (2017) provided connections to ~26M unelectrified homes. Quality of supply (hours/day) still uneven but access is near-universal. Saubhagya Portal / MoP ⟳ Aug 2026 update: v2025 (~99.9%, Saubhagya) stands. But v2014 '~67%' is the Census 2011 figure; by 2014 access was ~85% (World Bank API, verified). Either switch both baselines to the WB series (and accept a Mixed verdict) or keep Census-only and relabel the 2014 column as 2011. NDA's genuine edge is closing the hardest last mile (~26M Saubhagya connections to near-universal). ⟳ Editorial decision (Aug 2026 refresh): Verdict revised to Mixed on the consistent World Bank series (65.4% → 85.1% → ~100%): UPA added +19.7pp vs NDA's +14.4pp. NDA's distinct achievement was the hardest last mile — ~26M Saubhagya connections to reach near-universal access. · World Bank — Access to electricity (% of population), India ⟳ Gap-closure analysis (Aug 2026): Verdict revised to NDA Stronger under the distance-to-frontier rule for universal-coverage programs: UPA closed 57% of the remaining gap to 100% (65.4% → 85.1%), NDA closed 99% of a harder last-mile gap (85.1% → 99.9%) — ratio 1.74, above the 1.5× decisiveness threshold. Percentage points understate late-stage progress: the last 15% (remote hamlets, BPL households) is the most expensive to connect. |
| 37 | Coal Production (million tonnes) | ~361 (FY2003-04) | 566 | 1,048 (FY2024-25) | +50% | +85% (+482 MT) | NDA Stronger | India became coal self-reliant — imports reduced. Coal India production crossed 900 MT. Dual-edged: energy security vs. climate commitments. Coal India Ltd ⟳ Aug 2026 update: PIB/MoC officially cite 565.77 MT (FY14) -> 1,047.52 MT (FY25); published v2014 '612' is actually the FY2014-15 figure (609 MT) and v2003 '407' matches FY2005-06, not FY03 (~361 MT, MoC series — this one not re-verified from a primary page, hence overall medium). CY2025 output: 1,042.9 MT (prov.); FY26 target 1,151 MT, final actual not yet published. Corrections strengthen the NDA verdict: P1 +57% vs P2 +85%. · PIB — Ministry of Coal Year End Review 2025 (565.77 FY14 -> 1,047.52 FY25) · MoC Annual Report 2025-26, Ch.9 (FY25 actual 1,047.52 MT) |
| 38 | Electric Vehicles Sold (thousands, annual) | <1 | ~3 | ~2,551 (FY2025-26) | Nascent | Explosive | NDA Stronger | FAME I (2015), FAME II (2019), PLI for EV battery drove growth. 2-wheeler EVs dominate. Cars: ~100k units. VAHAN / SIAM ⟳ Aug 2026 update: Actuals now well past the published ~1,700: FY2025-26 registrations hit 2,550,865 (8.6% of all vehicle sales); CY2025 was 2,270,346 (+16.3% YoY). Vahan data. · EVreporter / Vahan — FY26 EV sales · IBEF — Vahan CY2025 data |
| NEW | Per Capita Electricity Consumption (kWh/year) | ~567 (FY03) | 957 | 1,460 (FY25) | +69% (+390 kWh) | +53% (+503 kWh) | Mixed | UPA wins on percentage, NDA on absolute kWh added (+503 vs +390) — the classic base-effect split, so an honest Mixed. Both eras roughly doubled-ish consumption; growth accelerated post-2020 as manufacturing and cooling demand picked up. PIB — per capita consumption 1,460 kWh FY25 (from 957 in FY14) / CEA Dashboard — per capita consumption series (from 2002-03) |
| NEW | Nuclear Power Installed Capacity (MW) | 2,720 | 4,780 | 8,780 (Dec 2025) | +76% (+2,060 MW) | +84% (+4,000 MW) | NDA Stronger | NDA edges it on both % and absolute (+4,000 MW vs +2,060 MW), with KAPP-3/4 and RAPP-7 commissioned and 8 reactors under construction. Fair caveat: UPA's 2008 civil nuclear deal unlocked the fuel imports that made the P2 expansion possible; both eras badly undershot official targets. MoS Jitendra Singh statement — 8,780 MW, Dec 2025 / World Nuclear Association — India profile (capacity history) |
| NEW | Peak Power Deficit (%) | ~12.2% (FY03) | 4.5% | 0.0% (FY25) | -7.7pp | -4.5pp (eliminated) | NDA Stronger | UPA cut more percentage points but still left a 4.5% peak shortfall (and deficits actually peaked at ~16.6% mid-UPA in FY08); under NDA the deficit went to effectively zero — FY25 energy shortfall was 0.1% with peak deficit 0.0% — turning India power-surplus. Elimination beats reduction. PIB — peak deficit 4.5% in 2013-14 / Vasudha Foundation — FY25 deficit 0.1%/0.0% (CEA data) |
| NEW | Ethanol Blending in Petrol (%) | ~0% (EBP launched 2003) | 1.5% | 20% (achieved 2025) | +1.5pp | +18.5pp | NDA Stronger | UPA launched the Ethanol Blended Petrol programme in 2003 but blending was still just 1.5% by 2013-14; NDA hit the 20% target in 2025, five years ahead of the original 2030 schedule, with ethanol supply rising from 38 crore litres (ESY14) to 660+ crore litres. One of the cleanest P2 wins in the energy stack. PIB — Ethanol Blending in India (1.5% FY14 -> 20% 2025) / Akashvani — 20% achieved 5 years early |
| NEW | Crude Oil Import Dependence (%) | ~73% (2004) | 77.6% | ~88% (FY25) | +5pp (worsened) | +10pp (worsened) | UPA Stronger | Dependence deteriorated in both eras but roughly twice as fast under NDA — despite a 2015 pledge to cut it to 67% by 2022. Domestic crude output actually peaked in FY12 (35.9 MMT, UPA era) and has slid to ~26 MMT since; FY26 dependence is now slightly above 90%. A useful counterweight to the renewables story: India's oil security worsened even as its electricity mix cleaned up. PPAC via The Wire — 77% FY14, 87.8% FY24, 88.3% Apr-Jul FY25 / Brookings Energy Security Series — 73% import dependence, 2004 / EY — FY26 dependence slightly above 90%; output peak FY12 |
C. Energy & Power — Section Score (12 metrics)
10
NDA ↑
0
UPA ↑
0
Mixed
D. Digital & Technology
| # | Metric | 2003 | 2014 | 2025/Latest | P1 Change (2003–14) | P2 Change (2014–25) | Verdict | Notes & Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 39 | Internet Users (millions) | ~18M | ~243M | 1,093 (Mar 2026) | +1,250% (+225M) | +350% (+850M) | NDA Stronger | P2 added 707M internet users vs P1's 225M — over 3x more in absolute terms. Jio (Sept 2016) dropped data to near-zero price; India went from the world's most expensive to cheapest data. Base effect: P1 started from only 18M. TRAI Telecom Subscription Data ⟳ Aug 2026 update: Published ~950M was a mid-2025 estimate; TRAI QPIR now reports 1,092.79M total internet subscribers at end-Mar 2026 (46.5M wired + 1,046.3M wireless). v2014 ~243M is consistent with TRAI's 251.6M at Mar 2014 (243M was the Jan 2014 IAMAI figure) — acceptable. · TRAI QPIR Jan-Mar 2026 (Tribune) · TRAI QPIR |
| 40 | Mobile Subscribers (millions) | 76 | 944 | ~1,300 (Jun 2026, incl 5G FWA) | +1,142% | +38% | Mixed | Verdict revised to Mixed on saturation/ceiling grounds. Both eras grew subscribers, but the addressable market is structurally capped at ~1.0–1.1B (population minus children under ~10 and the very elderly). P1 grew into a virgin market (76M → 944M, capturing most of the addressable population in one decade). P2 inherited a near-saturated market (944M → 1,170M) where additional growth is mathematically constrained — almost the entire addressable population already had a SIM by 2014. The headline P1 advantage (+1,142% vs +24%) is real but is mechanically driven by the ceiling, not by policy quality. The substantive transition in P2 has been smartphones (~150M → 850M+), mobile data (UPI, OTT, e-commerce), and second-SIM penetration. Comparing raw subscriber growth across the two eras isn't apples-to-apples. TRAI ⟳ Aug 2026 update: TRAI: wireless (mobile + FWA) subscribers reached 1,300.25M at end-Jun 2026 (mobile-only 1,277M in May 2026). Published ~1,170 is stale. Saturation argument in existing note still holds; verdict Mixed unchanged. · TRAI telecom subscription report Jun 2026 (tele.net) · TRAI May 2026 data (Outlook Business) ⟳ Gap-closure analysis (Aug 2026): Against a ~1.4B population ceiling, P1 closed 66% of the remaining gap and P2 78% (ratio 1.19) — below the 1.5× threshold; Mixed stands under the saturation-adjusted rule too. |
| 41 | Avg Mobile Data Cost (USD/GB) | ~$12 | ~$6 | ~$0.09 | −50% | −98.5% | NDA Stronger | Jio disruption made India the world's cheapest data market. Enabled digital public goods at population scale. Cable.co.uk Worldwide Mobile Data Pricing ⟳ Aug 2026 review: FLAG: $0.09/GB traces to Cable.co.uk's 2020 report, not 2025. Later Cable.co.uk rounds showed India ~$0.17 (2022, 3rd cheapest globally); their Jun 2026 survey (global avg $2.59/GB) was found but no India-specific 2025-26 figure surfaced in search. India remains among the world's cheapest data markets, so the verdict is safe, but the exact v2025 number could not be re-verified — recommend relabeling as '~$0.1-0.2 (India, among world's cheapest)' or citing the 2020 vintage explicitly. |
| 42 | Broadband Subscribers (millions) | ~1M | ~61M | 1,066 (Mar 2026) | +6,000% (+60M) | +1,648% (+1,005M) | NDA Stronger | P2 added 889M subscribers vs P1's 60M — 15x more in absolute terms. Jio triggered a complete market restructuring. Base effect: P1 started from ~1M, hence astronomical %. Fixed broadband still weak; 99% of P2 gains are wireless. TRAI ⟳ Aug 2026 update: TRAI broadband base was 1,065.88M at end-Mar 2026 (1,080M by May 2026). Published ~950M is stale. v2014 61M matches TRAI's 60.87M at Mar 2014 — correct. · TRAI QPIR Jan-Mar 2026 (Tribune) · TRAI May 2026 (Tech Outlook) |
| 43 | UPI Monthly Transactions (billions) | 0 | 0 | 23.66B (Jul 2026) | — | Built from zero | NDA Stronger | UPI launched Oct 2016. India now processes more real-time digital payments than USA + Europe + China combined. A genuine global first. NPCI UPI Stats ⟳ Aug 2026 update: Most stale row: NPCI reports a record 23.66B transactions worth Rs 29.88 lakh crore in Jul 2026 (763M/day, +22% YoY) vs published ~14B. Chart axis will need rescaling. · NPCI Jul 2026 via Business Standard |
| 44 | Aadhaar Enrollment (millions) | 0 | ~600M | ~1,440M (144+ crore, 2026) | +600M absolute | +840M absolute | Mixed | Verdict revised to Mixed — both eras contributed substantively. UPA initiated and built Aadhaar (UIDAI formed 2009, ~600M enrolled by 2014). NDA scaled and operationalised it (added 780M, integrated into DBT, Jan Dhan, ITR, KYC, vaccine drive). Absolute additions favour P2 (780M vs 600M) but P1 did the foundational work from zero. Calling either era "stronger" misses that this was a relay handoff that worked. UIDAI ⟳ Aug 2026 update: MeitY/UIDAI: 144+ crore Aadhaar IDs generated as of 2026; ~99% of adults enrolled. Published ~1,380M stale. Relay-handoff Mixed verdict unchanged. · UIDAI Aadhaar Dashboard · MeitY: 144+ crore Aadhaar IDs |
| 45 | IT / Software Exports (USD billion) | $13B | $86B | $233B (FY25 actual; $246B FY26E) | +562% (+$73B) | +171% (+$147B) | NDA Stronger | P2 added $204B in absolute IT exports vs P1's $73B — 2.8x more. GCC boom (1,700+ centres by 2025) is a structural P2 shift. Base effect: P1 started from $13B, hence high %. NASSCOM Tech Report 2025 ⟳ Aug 2026 update: CORRECTION, not just refresh: published ~$290B overstates EXPORTS — NASSCOM puts FY25 tech exports at $233B (rising to ~$246B in FY26E); ~$290-297B is TOTAL industry revenue incl domestic. Recomputed P2 absolute gain $147B still ~2x P1's $73B, so verdict NDA Stronger survives, but the row's number conflated two series. v2003 ($13B, FY04) and v2014 ($86B, FY14) check out. · NASSCOM FY26 outlook (Dataquest) · NASSCOM Strategic Review press release |
| 46 | Unicorn Startups (count) | ~1 | ~3 | ~120 (Aug 2026; 118-131 by methodology) | +2 | +~117 | NDA Stronger | India became 3rd largest startup ecosystem globally. Flipkart ($21B exit), Zepto, Meesho, CRED etc. driven by P2 conditions — cheap data, UPI, digital-native consumers. Hurun India / CB Insights ⟳ Aug 2026 update: Trackers diverge (Tracxn ~118 active; cumulative counts up to 131 incl listed/acquired; 6 new in 2026 YTD). Published ~110 is low. NOTE: this row duplicates row 48b — consider merging them. · Tracxn Indian Unicorns (Aug 2026) · Inc42 Unicorn Tracker |
| 47 | BharatNet — OFC Laid (km, cumulative) | 0 | 0 | ~719,000 (7.19 lakh km, Feb 2026) | — | New initiative | NDA Stronger | Target: fiber to all ~250,000 Gram Panchayats. Execution has been slower than planned but significant ground covered. DoT / BharatNet ⟳ Aug 2026 update: 7.19 lakh km laid and 2.15 lakh Gram Panchayats connected as of early 2026. Caveat worth adding to notes: a Feb 2026 parliamentary review flagged that only ~79,000 of ~2.64 lakh GPs had operational (live) connectivity — infrastructure laid vs actually-online gap persists. Verdict unchanged. · DD News: BharatNet 2.15 lakh GPs · Parliament flags utilisation gaps (Open) |
| 48 | CoWIN / DigiLocker / ONDC (digital public infra) | 0 | 0 | Active | — | Built in P2 | NDA Stronger | India Stack — Aadhaar + UPI + DigiLocker + CoWIN + ONDC — is arguably India's most globally replicated policy innovation. Recognized by IMF, World Bank, G20. India Stack |
| 48a | Global Innovation Index Rank (WIPO) | ~62/117 (2007)(53rd %ile) | 76/143 (2014)(53rd %ile) | 38/139 (2025)(27th %ile) | %ile: flat (53→53) | %ile: 53→27 (+26pp) | NDA Stronger | UPA kept India flat in innovation percentile rank despite global expansion. NDA moved India from 53rd to 30th %ile — driven by startup ecosystem growth, patent filings, R&D investment, and tech talent pool. India's GII rank improvement (76→39) is one of the largest rises globally in a decade. India now outranks China (26) is within reach. Target: top 25 by 2027. WIPO Global Innovation Index ⟳ Aug 2026 update: GII 2025 (released Sep 2025): India ranks 38th of 139, up from 39th in 2024. Also fixes a labeling error — the published '39/132 (2023)' mislabels the year (India was 40th in GII 2023; 39/133 was 2024). India is 1st globally in ICT services exports. Verdict unchanged. · GII 2025: India 38th (Mondaq) |
| 48c | ISRO — Satellites Launched & Major Milestones | ~8 satellites(2003–04 era baseline) | ~38 satellites (2003–14)1 landmark missionChandrayaan-1 (2008) | ~130 satellites (2014–25)6 landmark missions | ~30 satellites added1 landmark mission | ~92 satellites added6 landmark missions | NDA Stronger | Verdict based on total satellites launched + landmark missions. P1 (2003–14): ~38 satellites across PSLV/GSLV missions; landmark: Chandrayaan-1 (2008, India's first lunar orbiter, first to detect water ice on Moon). P2 (2014–25): ~130 satellites including PSLV-C37 (2017, set world record of 104 satellites in single launch — smashed previous record of 37), Cartosat, NavIC constellation (7 satellites, India's own GPS), and commercial launches via NewSpace India Ltd. Landmark missions: Mangalyaan/MOM (2014, first Asian Mars mission, first attempt globally to succeed), PSLV-C37 (world record), Chandrayaan-2 (2019, partial success), Chandrayaan-3 (2023, first ever soft landing on Moon's south pole), Aditya-L1 (2023, solar observatory at L1 point), Gaganyaan crewed mission in progress. NDA era is decisively stronger on both volume and milestone quality. ISRO ⟳ Aug 2026 review: FLAG: satellite counts (~38 P1 / ~130 P2) could not be re-verified in this pass and the row's basis is ambiguous (Indian satellites only vs incl. 400+ foreign satellites launched commercially). Milestone list is also now stale — it predates SpaDeX docking (Jan 2025), Axiom-4 crewed flight (Jun 2025) and NISAR (Jul 2025), which strengthen rather than weaken the P2 case. Verdict safe; numbers need a dedicated ISRO source check before charting. |
| NEW | 5G Subscribers (millions) | 0 | 0 | 400+ (Jan 2026) | — | Built from zero (launched Oct 2022) | NDA Stronger | India crossed 400M 5G users within ~3 years of the Oct 2022 launch — the world's second-largest 5G base after China and one of the fastest rollouts ever recorded. Generational caveat applies: 5G simply didn't exist in P1, so this measures execution speed, not a head-to-head; still, the rollout pace (vs India's famously late 3G/4G auctions in the 2000s) is the substantive contrast. RCR Wireless: India reaches 400M 5G subscribers / TelecomTalk: 400M+ 5G users |
| NEW | Mobile Phone Production (₹ crore, annual) | ~0 (negligible; handsets almost entirely imported) | ₹18,900 cr (FY2014-15) | ₹6.27 lakh cr (FY2025-26) | Minimal — first major assembly plants (Nokia Chennai, 2006) | +33x (₹18,900 cr → ₹6.27 lakh cr) | NDA Stronger | The cleanest manufacturing-policy win in the digital column: production up 33x and exports up 165-fold (₹1,566 cr → ₹2.60 lakh cr), making mobiles India's single largest export product in FY26. Caveat the article should keep: domestic value addition is still only ~20%, with a 35-40% target — much of the ₹6.27 lakh cr is assembly, not components. DD News / PIB: electronics manufacturing over 11 years / Mobile exports 165x (Parliament reply) |
| NEW | DBT — Direct Benefit Transfers (₹, annual) | 0 | ₹7,368 cr (FY2013-14) | ₹7.49 lakh cr (FY2025-26) | Launched Jan 2013 — pilot scale | +~100x (₹7,368 cr → ₹7.49 lakh cr); beneficiaries 11 cr → 176 cr | NDA Stronger | Another relay handoff like Aadhaar: UPA launched DBT (Jan 2013) and built the Aadhaar rail it runs on; NDA scaled it ~100x to 907 crore transactions across 300+ central schemes in FY26, with ₹3.48 lakh cr cumulative leakage savings claimed. Absolute scale-up is overwhelmingly P2, but the architecture is a P1 artifact — worth saying explicitly in the notes. PIB: India's DBT — Boosting Welfare Efficiency / DBT Bharat portal (FY14 baseline) |
| NEW | DigiLocker Registered Users (crore) | 0 | 0 | 72.4 crore (Aug 2026) | — | Built from zero (launched 2015) | NDA Stronger | Puts a hard number on the currently qualitative 'India Stack' row 48: 72.43 crore registered users and 5,437 document types issuable (per Rajya Sabha reply, Aug 2026). Roughly half the population holds a government-verified digital document wallet — a metric with no P1 analogue. Rajya Sabha reply: DigiLocker 72.43 crore users / DigiLocker |
| NEW | Data Centre Capacity (MW, colocation) | ~0 (negligible) | n/a — no tracked MW series (industry ~$0.39B) | ~1,500 MW (end-2025); ~1,800 MW by mid-2026 | Nascent | ~350 MW (2019) → ~1,800 MW (2026), 5x in 7 years | NDA Stronger | The AI-era infrastructure metric: JLL tracks growth from 350 MW (2019) to 1,030 MW (2024), ~1.5 GW at end-2025 and ~1.8 GW by mid-2026, with ~$30B committed. Charting caveat: no reliable 2014 MW figure exists (industry was ~$0.39B then), so chart this as a P2-only growth curve rather than a three-point comparison — hence medium confidence. Business Today: 2GW by 2026, $30B invested / Data centre industry in India (JLL series) |
D. Digital & Technology — Section Score (17 metrics)
15
NDA ↑
0
UPA ↑
2
Mixed
E. Public Health
| # | Metric | 2003 | 2014 | 2025/Latest | P1 Change (2003–14) | P2 Change (2014–25) | Verdict | Notes & Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 49 | Life Expectancy at Birth (years) | 64.3 | 68.5 | 72.0 (2023, World Bank/UN WPP) | +4.2 yrs | +3.5 yrs | Mixed | Verdict revised to Mixed. Three reasons: (a) diminishing returns — adding years gets structurally harder at higher life expectancies, (b) COVID-19 caused a 1–2 year setback in P2 (2020–21) that P1 did not face, (c) 2025 figure is projected, not measured. The 0.7-year gap (4.2 vs 3.5) is within the noise of these confounds. Both eras improved life expectancy meaningfully. World Bank / SRS India ⟳ Aug 2026 update: Replaced '~72 projected / 70.8 (2022)' with actual: WB 2023 = 72.0 (male 70.5, female 73.6). P2 change stays +3.5 yrs. Caveat: UN WPP 2024 revisions may have lifted the 2014 baseline (~70 in current WB series vs 68.5 published) — re-pull the full WB series before charting or the P1/P2 split will mix vintages. · WB series via TradingEconomics (2023 = 72.0) |
| 50 | Infant Mortality Rate (per 1,000 live births) | 58 | 40 | 25 (SRS 2023) | −18pp absolute | −15pp absolute | Mixed | Verdict revised to Mixed — near-identical magnitude + projected 2025. P1 −18pp vs P2 −19pp is a 1pp gap on absolute reduction — well within the "similar magnitudes" criterion. Plus the P2 figure (~21) is projected from 2020 actual (27); only achieved if recent decline rate holds. Both eras delivered consistent, near-identical pace of reduction. World Bank / SRS Bulletin ⟳ Aug 2026 update: SRS Statistical Report 2023 (released Sep 2025): IMR = 25 (historic low; 26 in 2022). The projected ~21 did NOT materialize. P2 becomes −15pp vs P1's −18pp — now modestly favors P1 but still within Mixed given P2 works from a lower base. Verdict Mixed holds. (v2003 sanity: SRS 2003 was 60, WB ~57; published 58 is acceptable.) · SRS Statistical Report 2023 summary · Data For India — Infant mortality |
| 51 | Maternal Mortality Ratio (per 100k live births) | ~254 | 167 | 88 (SRS 2020–22) | −87pp absolute | −79pp absolute | Mixed | India hit SDG target of <100 ahead of schedule. Projecting ~70 by 2025 at ~9 pts/yr decline. P2 absolute reduction (167→70 = 97pp) exceeds P1's (254→167 = 87pp). Institutional deliveries: 47% (2006) → 89% (2021). WHO / MoHFW SRS ⟳ Aug 2026 update: SRS Special Bulletin 2020–22 (published 2025): MMR = 88, down from 93 (2019–21) and 130 (2014–16). Published row projected ~70 by 2025 — too optimistic; decline pace slowed as levels fell. 8 states already at SDG target (<70). · SRS MMR Special Bulletin 2020–22 (Census India) · Data For India — Maternal mortality |
| 52 | Under-5 Mortality Rate (per 1,000 live births) | 76 | 49 | 29 (SRS 2023) | −27pp absolute | −20pp absolute | Mixed | Verdict revised to Mixed. Both eras reduced under-5 mortality substantially. The 4pp absolute-reduction gap (27 vs 23) is within the noise of (a) diminishing returns at lower bases (76→49 has more "low-hanging fruit" than 49→26), and (b) the 2025 figure being a projection from 2021 actual of 34. Both eras delivered on this metric. World Bank / UNICEF ⟳ Aug 2026 update: SRS 2023: U5MR = 29 (UN IGME 2023 estimate: 28). Projected ~26 did not materialize. P2 −20pp vs P1 −27pp — gap widens vs published (−23), but Mixed holds: base effects, plus IGME notes India's 2015–23 decline (−42%) outpaced South Asia (−33%) and world (−14%). · UNICEF/UN IGME 2024 report press release · SRS Statistical Report 2023 summary |
| 53 | Child Stunting Rate (% under 5, height-for-age) | 48.0% (2005-06) | 38.4% (2015-16) | 29.3% (NFHS-6, 2023-24) | −9.6pp | −9.1pp | Mixed | P1 reduced stunting by 9.6pp vs P2's 6.4pp projected — 1.5× larger absolute reduction. NFHS-5 (2019-21) actual was 35.5%; ~32% by 2025 is projected. Diminishing returns make further reduction from a lower base structurally harder, but the absolute pp gap is large enough that P1 wins by the same threshold we apply elsewhere. PM Poshan and ICDS continue to chip away. India still home to ~30% of world's stunted children. NFHS-4 (2015–16) & NFHS-5 (2019–21) ⟳ Aug 2026 update: MAJOR UPDATE: NFHS-6 (2023-24) results released June 2026 — stunting fell 35.5% → 29.3% between NFHS-5 and NFHS-6, a much faster drop than the pre-publication projection assumed. This flips the row from UPA Stronger to Mixed. · FACTLY — NFHS-6 results · Down To Earth — NFHS-6 child malnutrition |
| 54 | Child Wasting Rate (% under 5, weight-for-height) | 20.0% (2005-06) | 21.0% (2015-16) | ~19% (NFHS-6, 2023-24) | +1pp (worse) | −2pp | NDA Stronger | Critical nuance: wasting actually WORSENED under UPA (20→21%, +1pp). NDA reversed the trend — 21→19.3% actual (NFHS-5), projected ~17.5% by 2025. P2 absolute improvement: ~3.5pp vs P1's -1pp (worsening). Verdict is NDA Stronger on this important child nutrition metric. India still has world's highest wasting rate — work remains. NFHS-4 & NFHS-5 ⟳ Aug 2026 update: NFHS-6: wasting ~19% — better than NFHS-5's 19.3% but worse than the projected ~17.5%; NFHS-6 commentary calls wasting 'no improvement over the years'. Verdict NDA Stronger still holds on the direction argument (P1 worsened +1pp, P2 improved ~−2pp), but the magnitude claim should be softened. Severe wasting is the clearer NFHS-6 win: 7.7% → 5.2%. · Down To Earth — NFHS-6 (19% wasted, severe wasting 5.2%) · FACTLY — NFHS-6 results |
| 55 | Total Fertility Rate (TFR) | 2.9 | 2.3 | 1.9 (SRS 2023) | −0.6 | −0.4 | Mixed | Verdict revised to Mixed on saturation grounds. TFR has a natural floor (most demographers place it at ~1.5–1.7 globally; sub-replacement <2.1 represents a structural transition). P1 had room to drop from 2.9 → 2.3. P2 was working against the floor — going from 2.3 → ~1.9 is mathematically harder. India crossed replacement fertility (2.1) in 2020. Both eras meaningfully advanced the demographic transition; the 0.2 gap is within saturation noise. Significant state variation: South India <1.7, UP/Bihar ~3.0. SRS / World Bank ⟳ Aug 2026 update: Projection confirmed by actual: SRS 2023 TFR = 1.9 (steady at 2.0 in 2021–22, fell to 1.9 in 2023; rural 2.1, urban 1.5). Remove the 'proj.' qualifier. Verdict Mixed (saturation/floor argument) unchanged. · SRS Statistical Report 2023 summary · Outlook — TFR falls to 1.9 |
| 56 | Immunization — DPT3 Coverage (%) | 55% | 72% | 95% (2025, WHO/UNICEF WUENIC) | +17pp | +23pp (on published series) | NDA Stronger | Mission Indradhanush (2014 onwards) targeted zero-dose children in hard-to-reach areas. Improvement in P2 is stronger from an already higher base. WHO / UNICEF ⟳ Aug 2026 update: Latest WUENIC (Jul 2026 release, 2025 data): DTP3 = 95%; zero-dose children down 909k (2024) → 679k (2025); India exited the top-10 measles-unvaccinated list for the first time. SERIES FLAG: the 55% (2003) and 72% (2014) anchors look survey-based (NFHS/CES) while 91–95% is WUENIC — WUENIC's own mid-2010s India estimates were in the 80s, so the P2 gain is likely overstated by series mixing. Re-base the whole row on WUENIC before charting; verdict could soften to Mixed on a consistent series (could not pull the full historical WUENIC series — search budget exhausted). · UNICEF India — WUENIC 2025 estimates · WHO — WUENIC |
| 57 | Govt Health Expenditure (% of GDP) | 0.9% | 1.15% (NHA 2013-14) | 1.48% (NHA 2022-23, new GDP series; 1.43% old series) | +0.2pp | +0.33pp | Mixed | National Health Policy 2017 target: 2.5% of GDP by 2025. Progress made but still well below global average (6%). Ayushman Bharat (2018) a significant coverage expansion. National Health Accounts / NHP ⟳ Aug 2026 update: NHA 2022-23 (released May 2026): GHE = 1.48% of GDP (new series) / 1.43% (old); GHE nearly tripled in nominal ₹ (1.30 → 3.85 lakh crore, 2013-14 → 2022-23) and rose as share of total govt spend (3.78% → 4.89%) — those are the defensible NDA talking points, not the GDP ratio. · PIB — NHA Estimates 2022-23 · NHA 2022-23 summary |
| 58 | Ayushman Bharat — Beneficiaries Covered | 0 | 0 | ~560M | — | New scheme | NDA Stronger | Launched 2018. Provides ₹5 lakh/year health cover to bottom 40% families (~107M families). World's largest government-funded health insurance. Utilization still low in some states. PM-JAY National Health Authority ⟳ Aug 2026 update: Value stands (~55 crore ≈ 550-560M eligible beneficiaries). Enrich the note with actuals as of early 2026: 43.5+ crore Ayushman cards issued, 12+ crore families, 11.69 crore hospital admissions worth ₹1.73 lakh crore authorized, and the Oct 2024 Vay Vandana expansion covering ALL citizens 70+ regardless of income (1+ crore senior cards). · PM-JAY 2026 status (cards/admissions) |
| 59 | Malaria Cases (millions, annual) | 1.8M | 1.10M (2014) — published 0.88M was 2013's figure | 0.23M reported (2023) | −51% | −79% | NDA Stronger | Consistent decline in both eras. P2 reduction stronger from higher base — a genuine achievement. NVBDCP / WHO World Malaria Report ⟳ Aug 2026 update: Two errors fixed: (a) published '~0.34M (2022)' matches 2019, not 2022 — actual 2022 reported cases were ~0.18M and 2023 = 227,564 (PIB); (b) 0.88M as the 2014 anchor is actually 2013 (2014 spiked to ~1.10M). With corrected anchors: P1 1.87M→1.10M = −41%, P2 1.10M→0.23M = −79% — verdict NDA Stronger holds and strengthens. Caveats: 2024 provisional data showed a ~14% uptick through Oct; and do NOT mix in WHO's estimated series (~2M for 2023) — different methodology. India exited WHO's HBHI group in 2024. · PIB — India malaria elimination update (2.27 lakh cases, 2023) · NCVBDC — Magnitude of the problem |
| 60 | Global Hunger Index (GHI) Rank | 96/119(81st %ile) | 55/120(46th %ile) | 102/123 (2025)(83rd %ile), score 25.8 | +35pp %ile improved | −37pp %ile worsened (46th→83rd) | Mixed | Verdict revised to Mixed on methodology grounds. Three problems with this metric: (a) the country pool changed from 119 → 120 → 125, making cross-year rank comparisons noisy; (b) GHI methodology is officially contested by India (GoI's PIB statement disputes the child-wasting weighting heavily); (c) GHI relies on opinion-poll data for one of its four components, which India argues is non-rigorous. Both the apparent P1 improvement and P2 deterioration are partly artefacts of methodology rather than purely policy outcomes. Hard nutrition metrics (#52, #53) tell a more reliable story. Global Hunger Index / India's official response (PIB) ⟳ Aug 2026 update: GHI 2025 (Oct 2025): India 102nd of 123, score 25.8 ('serious') — improved from 111/125 (2023) and 105/127 (2024). Percentile worsening vs 2014 shrinks slightly (−43pp → −37pp). Verdict Mixed (methodology caveats) unchanged — the changing country pool point is reinforced by 125→127→123 in three years. · Global Hunger Index — India · GHI 2025: India 102/123, score 25.8 |
| 61 | TB Incidence (per 100,000 population) | ~217 | ~237 (2015 anchor, current WHO series — old-series '195' is not comparable) | 187 (2024, WHO Global TB Report 2025) | −10% | −21% (2015→2024) | Mixed | India pledged TB elimination by 2025 (5 yrs ahead of global target). COVID-19 reversed progress significantly — TB deaths rose in 2020–21. Target looks unlikely. WHO Global TB Report ⟳ Aug 2026 update: WHO Global TB Report 2025: India incidence 187/100k in 2024 (195 in 2023). WHO revised India's back-series upward (2015 re-based to 237) after the 2019-21 Gujarat prevalence survey — the row's 2003 (~217) and 2014 (~195) anchors are from the obsolete series and MUST be re-based before P1/P2 comparison. India still 25% of global TB burden; the 2025 elimination target (44/100k) missed. ⟳ Editorial decision (Aug 2026 refresh): Verdict revised to Mixed: on WHO's current re-based series P2 cut incidence 237 → 187 (−21%, ~2× the global pace) — the earlier 'flat under NDA' read was an artifact of mixing WHO series vintages. P1's slope on the re-based series is unverified, so neither era gets the win. · WHO Global TB Report 2025 summary · The Wire — 21% drop in TB incidence 2015-24 |
| 62 | Medical Colleges (MBBS) | ~250 | ~381 | 808 (2025-26, NMC seat matrix) | +52% | +112% | NDA Stronger | MBBS seats doubled from ~51,000 (2014) to ~1,09,000 (2024). Doctor density still low at ~1 per 1,000 population. NMC (National Medical Commission) ⟳ Aug 2026 update: 2024-25 actual: 780 colleges, 1,17,750 MBBS seats; 2025-26: 43 new colleges and +11,682 seats approved — NMC seat matrix shows 808 colleges / ~1.23 lakh seats (some reports cite up to 823 colleges / 1.37 lakh seats incl. later approvals — counts vary by cut-off date). Update the note's seat figure: ~51,000 (2014) → ~1,18,000+ (2025). Verdict NDA Stronger holds and strengthens. · Careers360 — NMC seat matrix 2025-26 · 43 new colleges / +11,682 seats, 2025-26 |
| 63 | Out-of-Pocket Health Expenditure (% of total health spend) | ~71% | 64.2% (NHA 2013-14) | 43.4% (NHA 2022-23) | −3pp | −20.8pp | NDA Stronger | Verdict based on absolute pp reduction (lower is better — less financial burden on households): P2 reduced by 21pp vs P1's 3pp. Ayushman Bharat (2018), state Mediclaim schemes, CGHS expansion drove dramatic shift. India's OOP was one of the world's highest; still above WHO-recommended 15–20% but trajectory has sharply improved. National Health Accounts / WHO ⟳ Aug 2026 update: NHA 2022-23: OOPE = 43.4% of total health expenditure (PIB). Two fixes: (a) v2014 was ~68%, NHA's official 2013-14 figure is 64.2%; (b) published '~47% (2022)' superseded. Nuance to add: OOPE actually ROSE from 39.4% (2021-22) to 43.4% (2022-23) as pandemic-era public spending normalized — trajectory across P2 is still sharply down (64.2 → 43.4). Verdict NDA Stronger holds. (v2003 '~71%' is close to NHA 2004-05's ~69% — acceptable, flag as approximate.) · PIB — NHA Estimates 2022-23 (OOPE 43.4%) · NewsOnAir — OOPE 64.2% (2013-14) → 39.4% (2021-22) |
| 64 | Hospital Beds per 1,000 Population (total, govt + pvt) | ~0.4 | ~0.7 | ~1.3 (2023) | +0.3 | +0.6 | NDA Stronger | Verdict based on absolute beds/1,000 added: P2 +0.6 vs P1 +0.3. AIIMS expansion (6 new under UPA, 16 under NDA), PM-ABHIM hospitals, private hospital growth. Note: most of P2 growth is private sector; public beds per capita barely improved. India still well below WHO benchmark of 3/1,000. NHA / NHSRC ⟳ Aug 2026 review: FLAG — could not verify '~1.3 (2023)' before the session's search budget was exhausted. Published estimates of India's bed density range ~1.1-1.6/1,000 depending on whether AYUSH and unregistered private beds are counted; there is no single official annual series. Recommend anchoring to one named source (NITI Aayog / WB SH.MED.BEDS.ZS) with its exact year before charting. |
| NEW | Institutional Deliveries (% of births in a health facility) | 38.7% (NFHS-3, 2005-06) | 78.9% (NFHS-4, 2015-16) | 88.6% (NFHS-5, 2019-21) | +40.2pp | +9.7pp | UPA Stronger | Janani Suraksha Yojana (2005) drove arguably the single largest behavioral shift in Indian public health — +40pp in a decade. P2's +9.7pp is real but ceiling-constrained: you cannot add 40 points from a 79% base, so grade P2 on closing the residual gap (which it did, 79→89). NFHS-6 (2023-24) will have a newer figure — pull it before charting. NFHS (IIPS/MoHFW) / NFHS-6 release coverage (for latest update) |
| NEW | Households with Health Insurance / Financing Coverage (%) | 4.8% (NFHS-3, 2005-06) | 28.7% (NFHS-4, 2015-16) | 41.0% (NFHS-5, 2019-21) | +23.9pp | +12.3pp (through 2019-21 only) | Mixed | P1's bigger pp jump came off a near-zero base via RSBY and state schemes; P2's NFHS-5 figure predates PM-JAY's full scale-up — with 43.5 crore Ayushman cards issued by early 2026 plus the 70+ universal expansion, the NFHS-6 number should be substantially higher and could flip this to NDA Stronger. Mixed until NFHS-6's figure is in hand. NFHS-3/4/5 (IIPS/MoHFW) / PM-JAY card issuance, 2026 |
| NEW | MBBS Seats (annual intake, thousands) | ~25,000 (early 2000s, MCI — unverified) | ~51,000 (2014-15, MCI/NMC) | 1,17,750 (2024-25; ~1.23 lakh approved for 2025-26) | ~2× | +129% | NDA Stronger | Cleanest supply-side health metric there is: intake capacity grew ~26k in 11 P1 years vs ~67k in 11 P2 years — a larger absolute AND percentage addition from a higher base, which defeats the usual base-effect defense. The pipeline effect on doctor density lands with a 5-6 year lag. 2003 anchor could not be verified within session limits — confirm against MCI annual reports before charting. NMC 2025-26 seat additions (1,17,750 base) / Careers360 — NMC seat matrix 2025-26 |
| NEW | Neonatal Mortality Rate (per 1,000 live births) | ~44 (2000, UN IGME) | 28 (2015, UN IGME) | 17 (2023, UN IGME) | −16 (2000→2015) | −11 (2015→2023) | NDA Stronger | Neonatal deaths are the hardest child deaths to prevent (they need facilities and skilled care, not just vaccines and ORS), so pace matters more than totals: P2 cut NMR ~1.4 pts/yr vs P1's ~1.1 pts/yr, and −39% in 8 years vs −36% in 15 — from a much lower base. Note the IGME anchors are 2000/2015/2023, not exactly 2003/2014 — label chart axes accordingly, or re-anchor to SRS. The 2000 value is derived from IGME's stated 61% decline over 2000-2023. UNICEF/UN IGME — India NMR 28 (2015) → 17 (2023) / UNICEF child survival data |
E. Public Health — Section Score (20 metrics)
9
NDA ↑
2
UPA ↑
5
Mixed
F. Education
| # | Metric | 2003 | 2014 | 2025/Latest | P1 Change (2003–14) | P2 Change (2014–25) | Verdict | Notes & Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 63 | Literacy Rate (%) | 65% (2001 Census) | 74% (2011 Census) | 80.9% (PLFS 2023-24) | +9pp | ~+7pp | Mixed | Verdict revised to Mixed on data-availability grounds. The 2021 Census was never conducted (delayed indefinitely by COVID). The P2 number is an ASER/PLFS-based estimate from 2021 — meaning the 2014–2025 comparison is built on (a) a 4-year-old proxy and (b) survey methodology that differs from the decennial Census. Without comparable Census data for both eras, a clean verdict isn't defensible. P1 also benefits from base effect (65% → 74% has more low-hanging fruit than 74% → 78%). 2011 Census: Census India ⟳ Aug 2026 update: Replaced the 2021 ASER/PLFS proxy (~78%) with the official PLFS 2023-24 figure: 80.9% literacy for age 7+. P2 change improves from ~+4pp to ~+7pp, but Mixed still holds — the comparison remains survey-vs-Census (2021 Census never happened) and P1 retains the base-effect advantage. Update the note text: the P2 number is no longer a 4-year-old proxy. · NewsOnAir (PLFS 2023-24, MoSPI) · PLFS 2023-24 literacy summary ⟳ Gap-closure analysis (Aug 2026): Gap-closure shares are nearly identical — UPA closed 26% of the remaining gap to full literacy, NDA 27% (ratio 1.03) — so Mixed stands even under the saturation-adjusted rule. |
| 64 | Secondary Gross Enrollment Ratio (%) | ~52% | ~65% | 77.4% (UDISE+ 2023-24) | +13pp | +12.4pp | Mixed | Both periods near-identical improvement. RTE Act (2009) drove P1 gains in primary; P2 gains came from secondary/higher secondary. UDISE+ / AISHE ⟳ Aug 2026 update: The ~79% was an estimate; the actual UDISE+ 2023-24 figure is 77.4%. IMPORTANT: do NOT use the UDISE+ 2024-25 secondary GER (~68.5%) — the 2024-25 report switched to individual student records and revised population projections, making it non-comparable with the old aggregate series. Mixed verdict holds: +13pp (P1) vs +12.4pp (P2) is still near-identical. · UDISE+ 2023-24 analysis · PIB — UDISE+ 2024-25 release (methodology change) ⟳ Gap-closure analysis (Aug 2026): NDA closed 35% of the remaining gap vs UPA's 27% (ratio 1.31) — direction favours P2 but below the 1.5× decisiveness threshold, so Mixed stands. |
| 65 | Higher Education GER (%) | ~10% | ~23% | 30.0% (AISHE 2023-24) | +13pp | +7pp | UPA Stronger | P1 added 13pp vs P2's 5pp — 2.6× larger absolute expansion. P1's task was easier (lower base), but the absolute gap is large enough that UPA wins by the same threshold we apply for NDA wins. Quality of expansion remains the open question in both eras — Indian higher-ed still produces ~20 institutions in the global top-500. NEP 2020 (P2) is the structural-quality response, but the GER number itself favours P1. AISHE Report ⟳ Aug 2026 update: AISHE 2023-24 (released Jul 2026) puts GER at 30.0, up from 23.7 in 2014-15 — the ~28% in the article was the stale 2021-22 figure. P2 change improves from +5pp to +7pp. UPA Stronger still holds (+13pp vs +7pp) but the margin narrows from 2.6x to 1.9x — soften the note accordingly. Total enrolment: 3.42 crore (2014-15) to 4.50 crore (2023-24). · PIB — AISHE 2022-23 & 2023-24 release · Drishti summary of AISHE 2023-24 |
| 66 | Number of IITs | 7 | 16 | 23 | +9 | +7 | Mixed | Both periods added IITs. Quality concerns about newer IITs in both eras — faculty shortages, research output. MoE |
| 67 | Number of Universities (total) | ~348 | ~723 | ~1,278 (AISHE 2023-24) | +108% (+375) | +77% (+555) | Mixed | Verdict revised to Mixed. Headline % favours P1 (+108%), but in absolute terms P2 added MORE universities (445 vs 375). The P1 % advantage is base-effect-driven. Both eras grew the university count substantially. Quality remains highly variable across both eras — only ~20 Indian institutions are in the global top-500. NEP 2020 is P2's structural reform response, but quality outcomes are slow-moving. UGC ⟳ Aug 2026 update: AISHE 2023-24: 1,289 universities registered on the portal, 1,278 responded — up from ~1,168 in the published row (which was AISHE 2021-22). P2 absolute additions grow to +555 vs P1's +375, strengthening the existing Mixed rationale (P1 wins on %, P2 wins bigger on absolute count). · PIB — AISHE 2023-24 · FACTLY — AISHE 2023-24 |
| 68 | School Dropout Rate — Secondary (%) | ~55% is cumulative Classes I-X dropout (MHRD), NOT the annual secondary rate — flag as non-comparable | ~17% | 8.2% (UDISE+ 2024-25) | −38pp | -8.8pp (17% to 8.2%, annual-rate series) | Mixed | P1 reduced secondary dropout by 38pp vs P2's 4.4pp — 8.6× larger absolute reduction. P1's task was structurally easier (more low-hanging fruit when 55% were dropping out), but the absolute gap is overwhelming. RTE Act (2009) and Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan drove the bulk of P1 reduction. P2 progressed against a much harder residual cohort (migrant households, marginalised rural). Both eras delivered meaningful reduction; the magnitude favours P1. UDISE+ ⟳ Aug 2026 update: v2025 updated from ~12.6% (2022) to 8.2% (UDISE+ 2024-25; was 10.9% in 2023-24). Caveat: 2024-25 uses individual student-ID tracking, so even the 2014-vs-2025 comparison carries some methodology noise. The bigger issue is the 2003 apples-to-oranges anchor, which flips the verdict. · PIB — UDISE+ 2024-25 · UDISE+ 2024-25 dropout/PTR detail |
| 69 | Education Spending (% of GDP) | 3.6% (World Bank, 2003; the published ~3.2% matches WB 2004-05, not 2003) | 3.9% (World Bank, 2014; published ~3.8% = WB 2013, close enough) | 4.1% (2022, World Bank series) | +0.3pp | +0.2pp | Mixed | NEP 2020 targets 6% of GDP. India spends less on education as % of GDP in P2 despite a larger economy. Absolute spending has risen but not kept pace with GDP. World Bank / MoE ⟳ Aug 2026 update: This is the biggest data-integrity fix in the section: same-series comparison erases the 'UPA Stronger' spending story. WB full series pulled from the World Bank API: 2003: 3.61, 2013: 3.84, 2014: 3.90, 2022: 4.10 (latest available). Definitional differences between WB and Economic Survey (centre+states budget) explain the level gap — pick ONE series and label it. ⟳ Editorial decision (Aug 2026 refresh): Verdict revised to Mixed: the original row mixed World Bank (2003/2014) with Economic Survey (2025) figures, manufacturing a decline. On the World Bank series alone (3.6% → 3.9% → 4.1%) both eras are flat; neither moved toward the 6% target. · Economic Survey series (2.7% in 2023-24) |
| 70 | Learning Outcomes (ASER rural % reading Std 2 text by Std 5) | ~53% (2008)' is doubtful — commonly cited ASER 2008 all-India figure is ~56%; 53% matches ASER 2010 (53.7%). Relabel or re-verify the P1 anchor | 48.0% (ASER 2024 report, Table 6, govt+pvt weighted) | 48.8% (ASER 2024) | −5pp (worse) | +0.8pp | NDA Stronger | Foundational literacy actually declined in P1 despite enrollment growth — the "schooling without learning" crisis. P2 recovery driven by NIPUN Bharat (2021) focus on foundational learning. ASER (Annual Status of Education Report) ⟳ Aug 2026 update: The published '~58% (2023)' is wrong — no such ASER data point exists (2023 was the 14-18yr 'Beyond Basics' survey). Actual ASER 2024: 48.8% (govt+pvt), i.e., 2014: 48.0 → 2018: 50.5 → 2022: 42.8 (COVID crash) → 2024: 48.8. P2 change collapses from '+10pp' to +0.8pp. Verdict 'NDA Stronger' survives only directionally (P1 declined ~5pp, P2 flat-to-slightly-up through a pandemic, with a genuine +6pp post-COVID recovery led by govt schools: 38.5 → 44.8, credited to NIPUN Bharat) — but the note must drop the +10pp claim and acknowledge the thin margin. Downgrade to Mixed if the article's verdict threshold requires a material gap. · ASER 2024 India national pages (Table 6, read directly) · ASER 2024 national findings |
| NEW | Number of IIMs | 6 | 13 | 22 | +7 | +9 | Mixed | Mirror-image of the IIT row: both eras roughly doubled the count (UPA added 7 including the 2010-11 batch; NDA added 9, though one is the NITIE-to-IIM Mumbai conversion in 2023 and IIM Guwahati arrived only in 2025). As with IITs, the quantity race is a draw — faculty depth and placement quality at the newest campuses lag the legacy six in both eras. Wikipedia — IIM list with establishment years |
| NEW | PhD Enrolment (lakh) | ~0.6 lakh (est., UGC era) | ~1.17 lakh (AISHE 2014-15) | 3.44 lakh (AISHE 2023-24) | ~+0.6 lakh (est.) | +2.27 lakh (~+194%) | NDA Stronger | PhD enrolment nearly tripled on the official AISHE series in P2 (1.17 lakh in 2014-15 to 2.03 lakh in 2019-20 to 3.44 lakh in 2023-24) — the fastest-growing programme level. Even generous assumptions about the patchy pre-AISHE baseline can't produce a P1 trajectory that matches a 3x. Open question for the note: research quality and per-scholar funding haven't scaled with headcount. PIB — AISHE 2023-24 (PhD 3.44 lakh) / PIB — AISHE 2021-22 (PhD +81.2% over 2014-15 baseline) |
| NEW | Pupil-Teacher Ratio — Secondary (students per teacher) | ~33 (est., MHRD SES) | 31 (UDISE 2014-15) | 21 (UDISE+ 2024-25) | ~-2 (est.) | -10 | NDA Stronger | Secondary PTR barely moved in P1 (enrolment expansion under RTE/SSA absorbed the teacher hiring) but fell from 31:1 to 21:1 in P2 — comfortably inside the NEP 2020 norm of 30:1 — as teacher count crossed 1 crore (UDISE+ 2024-25) while school-age cohorts started shrinking. Partly a denominator story (demographics), but the absolute improvement is real and official at both endpoints. UDISE+ 2024-25 PTR (with 2014-15 comparison: secondary 31:1) / PIB — UDISE+ 2024-25 |
| NEW | Schools with Internet Access (%) | ≈0% (negligible) | ~8% (est.) | 63.5% (UDISE+ 2024-25) | ≈+8pp (est.) | ~+55pp | NDA Stronger | The clearest P2 education win in absolute terms: school internet went from a rounding error to 63.5% (was still only 22% as late as 2019-20, so most of the jump is post-COVID). The 2014 anchor is estimate-grade because UDISE didn't track internet consistently then — but the verdict is robust to any plausible value. Caveat for the note: government schools (58.6%) still trail private (77.1%), and only 58% of school computers are functional. PIB — UDISE+ 2024-25 (internet 63.5%) / UDISE 2019-20 (internet 22%) |
F. Education — Section Score (12 metrics)
4
NDA ↑
3
UPA ↑
4
Mixed
G. Poverty, Welfare & Agriculture
| # | Metric | 2003 | 2014 | 2025/Latest | P1 Change (2003–14) | P2 Change (2014–25) | Verdict | Notes & Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 71 | Poverty Headcount ($2.15/day, 2017 PPP, %) | ~38% | ~21% | 2.3% (2022-23, $2.15 line); 5.3% at new $3.00/day (2021 PPP) line | −17pp | −19pp | NDA Stronger | Verdict revised to Mixed. Headline pp-reduction favours P1 (−17 vs −14) — a 3pp gap, within the similar-magnitudes noise window. Plus P2's −14pp is partly projected (actual 12.9% in 2021; ~7% in 2025 assumes continued decline). Crucially, getting from 21% → 7% is structurally harder than 38% → 21% (diminishing returns at lower bases). Both eras delivered historically significant poverty reduction. World Bank PovcalNet ⟳ Aug 2026 update: World Bank's June 2025 poverty-line revision superseded the published projection: extreme poverty (new $3.00/day, 2021 PPP line) fell from 27.1% (2011-12) to 5.3% (2022-23); at the old $2.15 line it is 2.3% — far below both the '12.9% (2021)' actual and the '~7% proj.' shown. 171 million people exited extreme poverty 2011-12 to 2022-23. Recommend restating the row on the $3.00 line for future-proofing. ⟳ Editorial decision (Aug 2026 refresh): Verdict revised to NDA Stronger: World Bank's June 2025 update puts 2022-23 extreme poverty at 2.3% ($2.15 line) / 5.3% (new $3.00 line) — P2's −19pp exceeds P1's −17pp from a much harder, lower base; 171M people exited extreme poverty 2011-12 → 2022-23. Caveat: HCES 2022-23 changed survey methodology vs NSS 2011-12, so the series is not strictly comparable. · World Bank — June 2025 Update to Global Poverty Lines · Data For India — World Bank poverty estimates explainer · Deccan Herald — 171M lifted from extreme poverty (World Bank) |
| 72 | Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI, % MPI poor) | 55.1% (2005-06) | ~33% (2015-16) | 11.28% (2022-23, NITI Aayog projection); 14.96% actual NFHS-5 (2019-21) | −22pp | −22pp | Mixed | Verdict revised to Mixed — near-identical magnitude + projected 2025. P1 −22pp vs P2 −24pp is a 2pp gap on absolute reduction — well within similar-magnitudes noise. NITI Aayog's actual 2022-23 number is 11.28%; the ~9% by 2025 figure is projected. Programs that contributed to P2 reduction (Ujjwala, Jal Jeevan, PM-AWAS, Swachh Bharat) are clearly NDA's, but the rate of MPI improvement was already strong under P1 (NFHS-3 to NFHS-4). Both eras delivered historic gains; the comparison isn't policy-distinguishing. OPHI MPI / NITI Aayog MPI India ⟳ Aug 2026 update: No newer official MPI released as of Aug 2026 — NITI's 11.28% (2022-23) remains the latest; NFHS-6 fieldwork will drive the next update. Dropped the unverifiable '~9% (proj. 2025)' — v2025 should show the 11.28% figure as the headline. P2 change recomputed as ~33% → 11.28% = −22pp vs P1 −22pp: verdict stays Mixed, magnitudes essentially identical. · OPHI — India national MPI directory · NITI Aayog National MPI Progress Review 2023 |
| 73 | Open Defecation Free — Rural Sanitation Coverage (%) | ~22% | ~39% | ~75% at-least-basic; 17% rural still open-defecating (JMP 2022); govt claims 100% ODF | +17pp | +36pp | NDA Stronger | Govt claims 100% ODF (10+ crore toilets built). JMP/independent surveys: 70%+ using improved sanitation. Even at 70%, the improvement is dramatic. Swachh Bharat Mission / WHO-UNICEF JMP 2023 ⟳ Aug 2026 update: Refined with latest independent JMP data: ~75% of rural India had at-least-basic sanitation and 17% still practiced open defecation in 2022 (JMP 2000-2022 report); WHO/JMP put safely-managed sanitation at ~63% nationally (2024). Slightly better than the published '~70%+'. Verdict NDA Stronger unchanged. · WHO-UNICEF JMP 2000-2022 report · WHO-UNICEF JMP 2000-2024 report |
| 74 | Tap Water Access — Rural Households (%) | ~18% | ~32% | 82.1% — 15.89 of 19.36 crore rural households (Jul 2026) | +14pp | +50pp | NDA Stronger | Jal Jeevan Mission (Aug 2019): 14.6 crore rural households connected with tap water. Over 11 crore new connections in 5 years. Jal Jeevan Mission Dashboard ⟳ Aug 2026 update: JJM dashboard moved from 75.8% (Mar 2024) to 82.1% coverage by Jul 2026 (15.89 crore households; 3.23 crore at launch in Aug 2019). Mission extended to Dec 2028 under JJM 2.0 with outlay raised to ₹8.69 lakh crore. P2 change now +50pp. Verdict NDA Stronger reinforced. · Millennium Post — rural tap coverage 81.8%+ |
| 75 | LPG Connections (millions, total India) | ~96M | ~148M | ~330M active (Apr 2025) | +54% | +123% | NDA Stronger | Ujjwala Yojana gave free LPG connections to ~10.35 crore BPL women. Refill rates are a concern (~3.5 cylinders/year vs ~7 for others) — cost remains a barrier. PMUY / MoPNG ⟳ Aug 2026 update: Active domestic LPG consumers: 32.94 crore as of Mar 1, 2025 (~33 crore by Apr 2025), incl. 10.33 crore PMUY beneficiaries; 25 lakh more PMUY connections sanctioned for FY26. Updated from ~315M; P2 change +123%. FLAG: v2003 '~96M' could not be verified — PPAC-era data suggests domestic consumers in 2003-04 were closer to ~75-80M; worth rechecking against the PPAC LPG Profile before charting. · The Statesman — 32.94 crore active LPG consumers (Mar 2025) · PPAC — active domestic LPG customers |
| 76 | Jan Dhan Bank Accounts (millions) | 0 | ~15M (Aug 2014) | ~588M (Jul 2026) | Program started | +3,820% | NDA Stronger | Launched Aug 28, 2014. Largest financial inclusion drive in history. Average balance ~₹4,000. Enabled direct benefit transfer (DBT). PMJDY Portal / DFS ⟳ Aug 2026 update: PMJDY reached 58.77 crore accounts with ₹3.12 lakh crore deposits by Jul 15, 2026 (avg balance now ~₹5,300, up from the ~₹4,000 in the note). Updated from ~530M. Verdict NDA Stronger unchanged. · UNI — Jan Dhan accounts rise to 58 crore+ |
| 77 | MGNREGA Person-Days Generated (crore/yr) | ~9 (FY06, partial) | 166 (FY14) | ~240 (FY25) | Scheme built | +44% | UPA Stronger | Higher MGNREGA demand signals rural distress, not success. P2 saw higher demand (peak FY21: 389 crore — COVID year). Real rural wages grew at <2% vs >5% in P1. The program expanded but the distress signal is concerning. MoRD MGNREGA Dashboard ⟳ Aug 2026 update: Person-days FELL sharply from 312.4 crore (FY24) to 239.7 crore (FY25) — the published '~312 (FY24)' is stale. P2 change drops from +88% to +44%. Verdict stays UPA Stronger under the article's distress-signal framing (real rural wage stagnation persists), but the note should acknowledge the FY25 decline — critics attribute it to Aadhaar-based payment/job-card deletions rather than falling distress, so the interpretation cuts both ways. · Vision IAS / The Hindu — MGNREGS person-days FY25 · PIB — MGNREGS person-days FY07-FY25 |
| 78 | Food Grain Production (million tonnes, annual) | ~213 | ~265 | ~358 (FY25, final estimate) | +27% | +35% | NDA Stronger | Both periods near-identical growth. India became a net food exporter. However, nutritional diversity (pulses, vegetables) is lagging cereal growth. DACFW / MoAFW ⟳ Aug 2026 update: FY25 final estimates (released Nov 2025): record 357.73 MT, up 21.66 MT in one year. Also fixed v2003: 2003-04 foodgrain output was 213.2 MT, not ~208 (which makes P1 +24%). DUPLICATION FLAG: this row and row 85 are the same metric with slightly different numbers — recommend merging into one row. ⟳ Editorial decision (Aug 2026 refresh): Verdict revised to NDA Stronger with FY25's record final estimate (357.7 MT) and the corrected 2003-04 base (213.2 MT): P2 +35% vs P1 +24% — no longer near-identical growth. · Global Agriculture — FY25 final estimate 357.73 MT · PIB — Final estimates of major crops |
| 79 | MSP for Paddy (₹/quintal) | ₹550 | ₹1,310 | ₹2,369 (KMS 2025-26) | +130% | +81% | UPA Stronger | P1 saw larger MSP hikes. Inflation-adjusted (real) MSP growth was strong in P1; real growth in P2 has been modest after accounting for inflation. CACP (Commission for Agricultural Costs and Prices) ⟳ Aug 2026 update: Cabinet approved ₹2,369/quintal (common paddy) for Kharif 2025-26 (+₹69 YoY) — updates the ₹2,183 FY24 figure. v2003 flag: CACP series shows 2003-04 common-paddy MSP at ₹550 (₹570 appears to mix in the Grade-A premium); with ₹550 base, P1 change is +138% and P2 +81% — verdict UPA Stronger unchanged, gap actually widens in nominal terms. · Deccan Herald — paddy MSP ₹2,369 for 2025-26 |
| 80 | PM Awas Yojana — Houses Constructed (millions) | 0 (IAY precursor) | ~4M (IAY cumulative) | ~40M completed (PMAY-G ~29.5M + PMAY-U ~10M, early 2026) | Prior scheme | 10x scale | NDA Stronger | PMAY built more houses in absolute terms. Quality of construction and actual occupancy rates are the legitimate critique. PMAY-G Portal / PMAY-U MIS ⟳ Aug 2026 update: Published '~40M+' now confirmable with actuals: PMAY-G 2.95 crore completed (Feb 2026, of 3.87 crore sanctioned; target 4.95 crore by 2029) + PMAY-U crossed 1 crore completed (Aug 2026, 1.25 crore sanctioned). Value effectively unchanged but can now be stated precisely. Verdict NDA Stronger unchanged. · NewsOnAir — PMAY-G 3.87 crore sanctioned, 2.95 crore completed · DD India — PMAY-U crosses 1 crore delivered |
| 81 | Real Rural Wage Growth (avg annual, %) | — | — | — | ~5–6% real | <2% real | UPA Stronger | One of the most concerning economic signals of P2. Rural wages grew fast in P1 (MGNREGA floor effect, low base). Real wage growth collapsed post-2014. High MGNREGA demand corroborates. RBI KLEMS / Labour Bureau Agricultural Wages Report |
| 82 | Milk Production (million tonnes, annual) | 88.1 (2003-04) | 137.7 (2013-14) | 247.9 (FY25) | +51% | +80% | NDA Stronger | India is world's largest milk producer. Growth accelerated in P2; India supplies ~24% of global milk output. DAHD (Dept of Animal Husbandry) ⟳ Aug 2026 update: DAHD: FY25 output 247.87 MT (+3.6% over FY24's 240 MT). Also flagged base-year mismatch: published 96.9 is the 2005-06 figure and 146.3 is 2014-15 — the era-consistent values are 88.1 MT (2003-04) and 137.7 MT (2013-14), giving P1 +56% and P2 +80%. Verdict NDA Stronger unchanged (strengthened). · DAHD — milk production 247.87 MT in 2024-25 · DAHD Annual Report 2024-25 |
| 83 | DBT (Direct Benefit Transfer) — Annual (₹ lakh crore) | ~0 | ~0.7 (FY14) | ~8.5 (FY25) | Launched | +1,114% | NDA Stronger | DBT started under UPA (2013). NDA scaled massively — ₹34 lakh crore cumulative transferred 2014–2024. Leakage reduced significantly (Aadhaar+Jan Dhan+Mobile trinity). DBT Bharat Portal ⟳ Aug 2026 update: FY25 DBT payouts crossed ₹8.5 lakh crore, the highest since launch (cumulative savings from leakage-plugging estimated at ₹3.48 lakh crore till 2024). Updated from ~7.4 FY24. Verdict NDA Stronger unchanged. · DBT Bharat Portal · Vision IAS — DBT savings ₹3.48 lakh crore |
| 84 | Free Food Grain (PM Garib Kalyan Ann Yojana — beneficiaries) | 0 | 0 | 800M (2020–2024) | — | New scheme | NDA Stronger | Launched during COVID-19 (April 2020). 5 kg free grain/person/month to ~80 crore NFSA beneficiaries. Extended to Dec 2028. World's largest food security program. Fiscal cost: ~₹11.8 lakh crore over 5 years. DFPD / MoCA |
| 86 | Wheat Yield (tonnes/hectare) | ~2.71 | ~3.18 | ~3.65 (FY25) | +0.47 t/ha | +0.47 t/ha | Mixed | Verdict revised to Mixed. The 0.10 t/ha gap (0.47 vs 0.37) is within typical annual yield variability driven by monsoon, fertiliser supply, and pest pressure — not necessarily attributable to policy differences. Both eras improved yields steadily through MSP incentives, fertiliser subsidies, and seed-quality programs. India's wheat yield is still well below global best (China: ~5.6 t/ha; France: ~7+ t/ha) — the real story is that neither era closed that gap meaningfully. DACFW / FAOSTAT ⟳ Aug 2026 update: FY25 wheat output hit a record 115.3-117.5 MT on ~31.8 Mha, implying yield ~3.6-3.7 t/ha (up from ~3.55 FY24). P2 gain now ~+0.47 t/ha, matching P1's +0.47 — still within noise, verdict Mixed unchanged. Yield figure is derived (production/area), not a directly published number — mark accordingly. · UkrAgroConsult — record wheat 115.3 MT in 2024-25 · USDA FAS — India Grain and Feed Annual |
| NEW | Horticulture Production (million tonnes, annual) | ~170.8 (2004-05) | 280.7 (2013-14) | 369.1 (FY25, 3rd AE) | +64% | +31% | UPA Stronger | Horticulture now out-produces foodgrains (369 vs 358 MT) — the quiet diversification story of Indian agriculture. But the growth rate tells the opposite of the usual base-effect script: P1 added ~110 MT (+64%) off a smaller base in 9 years, P2 added ~88 MT (+31%) in 11. NHM/mission-mode investment of the mid-2000s did the heavy lifting; P2 sustained but did not accelerate it. PIB — horticulture final estimates 2024-25 / NABARD policy paper — horticulture 170.8 MT in 2004-05 / EastFruit — 2024-25 output +4% |
| NEW | Agricultural & Allied Exports (US$ billion, annual) | $7.5B (FY04) | $43.3B (FY14) | $51.9B (FY25) | +474% | +20% | UPA Stronger | The starkest agri contrast in the section: exports grew ~5.7x under P1 vs +20% under P2 ($52.55B even in FY26). The honest caveat is that P1 rode the 2003-13 global commodity supercycle, which ended almost exactly at the handover — and P2 added export bans (wheat 2022, rice 2023) that capped the upside. Even so, an 11-year near-plateau in dollar terms is a genuine underperformance signal. IMPRI — agri exports $7.53B (FY04) to $43.25B (FY14) / India News Network — agri exports $51.86B in FY25 / Rural Voice — FY26 agri exports $52.55B |
| NEW | Fish Production (lakh tonnes, annual) | 64.0 (FY04) | 95.8 (FY14) | 197.8 (FY25) | +50% | +106% | NDA Stronger | Output more than doubled in P2 (+106%) vs +50% in P1, off a larger base — a clean acceleration, not a base effect. PMMSY (2020, ₹20,050 crore) and the Blue Revolution push drove aquaculture productivity to 4.77 t/ha; India is now the world's 2nd-largest fish producer with seafood exports at a record ₹62,408 crore in FY25. PIB — fish production 197.75 lakh t (FY25) vs 95.79 (FY14) / BW Businessworld — 63.99 lakh t in 2003-04 |
| NEW | Consumption Inequality — Rural Gini Coefficient | 0.281 (2004-05, NSS) | 0.287 (2011-12, NSS) | 0.237 (2023-24, HCES) | +0.006 (slightly worse) | −0.050 (improved) | NDA Stronger | Rural consumption inequality was flat-to-worsening through P1's high-growth years, then fell to 0.237 by 2023-24 (urban: 0.364 → 0.284) — consistent with the free-foodgrain/DBT welfare floor compressing the bottom of the distribution. Caveat worth stating: HCES 2022-24 changed survey methodology vs older NSS rounds, and consumption Ginis understate income/wealth inequality, which independent estimates (WID) show rising. MoSPI HCES 2023-24 press note — Gini 0.237 rural / 0.284 urban / Himanshu (Seminar) — NSS Gini 2004-05 and 2011-12 |
G. Poverty & Welfare — Section Score (19 metrics)
12
NDA ↑
3
UPA ↑
4
Mixed
H. Security & Defence
| # | Metric | 2003 | 2014 | 2025/Latest | P1 Change (2003–14) | P2 Change (2014–25) | Verdict | Notes & Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 85 | Defence Budget (USD billion) | ~$20B | ~$38B | ~$92B (SIPRI 2025) | +90% | +142% | Mixed | Both periods near-doubled defence spending. India is world's 4th largest defence spender. SIPRI Military Expenditure Database ⟳ Aug 2026 update: SIPRI 2025: India spent $92.1B (+8.9% YoY, partly driven by the May 2025 conflict with Pakistan), now world's 5th largest spender — Germany overtook India, so the '4th largest' claim in the notes needs updating to 5th. MoD FY2026-27 allocation is an all-time-high Rs 7.85 lakh crore (+15.2%). ⟳ Editorial decision (Aug 2026 refresh): Kept Mixed: the latest $92.1B is SIPRI total-expenditure basis while the 2003/2014 anchors are budget-basis — not directly comparable; on a consistent basis the two eras are similar. · ETV Bharat — SIPRI 2025 report, India 5th at $92.1B · PIB — MoD Budget 2026-27 Rs 7.85 lakh crore |
| 86 | Defence Budget (% of GDP) | ~2.8% | ~2.4% | ~2.0% | −0.4pp | −0.4pp | Mixed | Verdict revised to Mixed — identical change in both eras. Both P1 and P2 reduced defence as % of GDP by exactly the same 0.4pp. There is no meaningful difference between the eras on this metric — the previous "UPA Stronger" verdict was misapplied (both declined equally). Underlying story: defence spending grew in absolute terms but didn't keep pace with GDP growth. Given border tensions (China 2020, Pakistan) many analysts flag underinvestment. NATO benchmark is 2%. SIPRI |
| 87 | Indigenous Defence Procurement (% of defence budget) | ~30% | ~40% | 75% (actual earmark, FY2026-27) | +10pp | +35pp | NDA Stronger | Make in India Defence — positive lists mandating domestic procurement. India's defence exports: $1.5B (FY24) vs ~$200M (2014). Tejas, INS Vikrant, ATAGS howitzer etc. MoD Annual Report ⟳ Aug 2026 update: No longer a 'target' — it is an enacted earmark: Rs 1,39,100 crore (75% of the FY2026-27 modernisation budget) is reserved for the domestic industry, up from 40% in 2020-21 (IDSA). Supporting actuals: defence production hit a record Rs 1.78 lakh crore in FY2025-26 (+15.6% YoY) and exports Rs 38,424 crore. Update the stale exports line in notes ($1.5B FY24 → ~$4.5B FY26). Verdict NDA Stronger reinforced. · MP-IDSA — MoD 2026-27 Budget Estimates analysis · PIB — Defence production record Rs 1.78 lakh crore FY26 |
| 88 | Terrorist Incidents — Annual (India total) | ~1,000+ | ~700 | ~200–300 | −30% | −57% | NDA Stronger | Significant decline in overall terrorist incidents. Reflects both NE peace accords and declining Naxal violence. J&K remains complex. SATP (South Asia Terrorism Portal) ⟳ Aug 2026 update: Published '~200-300' range still defensible for 2025 but is definition-sensitive: MHA reported 234 LWE incidents alone in 2025 (SATP counted 141), while J&K incidents are at record lows (44 in 2023 per MHA). Flag for the notes: 2025 was NOT incident-free — the Pahalgam massacre (Apr 2025, 26 civilians killed) triggered Operation Sindoor (May 2025), and a Delhi blast followed in Nov 2025. Fatalities nonetheless stayed at multi-decade lows. · VIF — Terrorism dynamics 2025 round-up (SATP data) · Dataful — LWE incidents trend |
| 89 | Left Wing Extremism (Naxal) — Annual Deaths (total) | ~717 (2006) | ~422 (2014) | 100 (2025) | −41% | −76% | NDA Stronger | LWE districts: 180 (2014) → ~45 (2024). Target: LWE-free India by 2026. Significant acceleration in P2. MHA Annual Report ⟳ Aug 2026 update: Actuals replace the 2023 placeholder: MHA — civilian+SF deaths fell to 100 in 2025 (down 90% from the 1,005 peak of 2010); LWE incidents 234 in 2025 (vs 1,936 in 2010); 364 Naxals neutralised, 1,022 arrested, 2,337 surrendered in 2025. Districts note needs updating: 11 LWE-affected districts by Dec 2025 and ZERO by April 2026 per MHA — the 'LWE-free by 2026' target was effectively met. Verdict NDA Stronger strongly reinforced. · Factly — zero LWE-affected districts (2026) · MHA Lok Sabha answer, Feb 2026 · ETV Bharat — MHA: LWE districts down to 11 (2025) |
| 89a | Naxal (LWE) — Civilian Deaths Specifically (annual) | ~170 (2004) | ~190 (2014) | ~54 (2025) | +20 (worsened) | −136 | NDA Stronger | Key point: civilian deaths from Naxal violence actually INCREASED under UPA (170→190) as LWE violence peaked around 2009-2011. NDA dramatically reduced civilian toll from 190 to ~45 — a 76% drop. Combined with security force operations, shrinking LWE geography, and development of "aspirational districts," this is a genuine NDA achievement. SATP India Casualties Database / MHA Annual Report ⟳ Aug 2026 update: 2025 actual (SATP): 54 civilians killed in 141 LWE incidents — marginally above 2023's ~45 amid intense final-phase operations in south Bastar, but still −72% vs 2014's ~190. Verdict unchanged. · VIF 2025 round-up citing SATP LWE casualty data |
| 89b | Civilian Deaths from Terrorism — All India (excl. Naxal, annual) | ~2,200 (2003) | ~370 (2014) | ~85 (2024) | −1,830 absolute | −285 absolute | NDA Stronger | Verdict revised to NDA Stronger. P1's larger absolute reduction is base-effect driven — the 2001–03 peak was post-9/11 / post-Kandahar exceptional violence, and the subsequent fall was substantially driven by external factors (international counter-terrorism pressure on Pakistan, J&K-specific de-escalation). P2's achievement — bringing civilian terror deaths to <100/year in a country of 1.4B people — is the harder and more policy-attributable outcome. Crossing into "historically low" territory matters more than the size of the fall from an outlier peak. SATP India Terrorism Database ⟳ Aug 2026 review: Confidence low because SATP's site blocks direct access and no single published all-India-excl-LWE civilian figure for 2025 was found. Verified components: J&K 28 civilians (SATP — includes the 26 Pahalgam victims), plus the Nov 2025 Delhi blast and minimal Northeast fatalities. The <100/year claim underpinning the verdict still holds despite Pahalgam. Verdict unchanged. |
| 90 | J&K Militant Incidents (annual) | ~1,990 (2005) | ~222 (2014) | 44 (2023, MHA); 92 total fatalities in 2025 — lowest in 20+ years | −89% | −80% | Mixed | Massive P1 reduction (from peak 2001–05 levels). P2 saw Article 370 abrogation (2019) — incidents flat despite structural change. Civilian casualties have declined. SATP J&K Data ⟳ Aug 2026 update: Corrected series (MHA parliament data): 222 (2014) → 228 (2018 local peak) → 44 (2023). Decadal comparison: 7,744 violence incidents in 2014-24 vs 16,463 in 2004-14; infiltration attempts 141 (2019) → 3 (2024). SATP fatalities: 92 killed in 2025 (28 civilians, 17 SF, 46 militants) — least violent year in over two decades DESPITE Pahalgam (Apr 2025) and the subsequent Operation Sindoor India-Pakistan military exchange (May 2025). Also flag: v2003 cell is labelled '(2005)' — mismatched year label. · Business Standard — MHA to parliamentary panel · Deccan Herald — 228 (2018) to 44 (2023), Parliament · The Wire — SATP J&K annual fatalities 2018-2025 |
| 91 | India Global Peace Index Rank | ~132/140 (2008)(94th %ile) | 143/162(88th %ile) | 115/163 (2025); fell to 127/163 (2026) | +6pp %ile improved | +17pp %ile improved | NDA Stronger | Percentile-adjusted: UPA improved India from 94th to 88th %ile (+6pp). NDA improved from 88th to 71st %ile (+17pp) — a significantly stronger improvement. Raw rank change (143→116) understates the improvement since country count grew. GPI — Institute for Economics & Peace ⟳ Aug 2026 update: GPI 2025 (era endpoint): 115/163 ≈ 71st %ile — matches the published story, NDA Stronger holds. But GPI 2026 dropped India 12 places to 127/163 (score 2.409, ≈78th %ile), reflecting the May 2025 India-Pakistan conflict. On 2026 data the NDA %ile gain narrows to +10pp vs UPA's +6pp — verdict survives but the margin shrinks; worth a caveat in notes. · GPI 2026 — India 127/163 |
| 92 | India's Nuclear Warheads (estimated) | ~45–95 | ~90–110 | ~190 (Jan 2026) | Modest increase | Significant increase | NDA Stronger | India modernising nuclear triad (land, sea, air). INS Arihant operational (SSBN). No-first-use policy maintained. SIPRI World Nuclear Forces ⟳ Aug 2026 update: SIPRI Yearbook 2026: ~190 warheads as of Jan 2026 (180 a year earlier; published 172 was the Jan 2024 estimate). Notable posture shift: for the first time ~12 warheads assessed as operationally 'deployed' — a departure from India's traditional de-mated peacetime posture. Verdict unchanged. · India's World — SIPRI Yearbook 2026 analysis |
| 93 | UN Peacekeeping — Troops Deployed (annual avg) | ~4,500 | ~8,000 | ~6,000 (2026) | +3,500 | −2,000 | UPA Stronger | Verdict based on absolute troop change: P1 added 3,500 troops (+78%); P2 reduced by 2,200 (−28%). India is historically one of the world's largest UN peacekeeping contributors. The P2 reduction reflects a deliberate foreign policy shift — India is pursuing bilateral/strategic relationships over multilateral UN commitments. Not necessarily bad policy, but the metric shows UPA had greater multilateral engagement by this measure. UN Peacekeeping Data ⟳ Aug 2026 update: UN in India (2026): 'more than 6,000 personnel currently deployed' across 12 missions; 5,901 as of Dec 2023 (rank #1 among troop contributors). Slightly up from the published ~5,800 but still well below 2014's ~8,000 — verdict (UPA Stronger) unchanged. · UN Peacekeeping — India country page |
| NEW | Defence Exports (Rs crore, annual) | ~Rs 230 cr (FY03, ~$47M) | Rs 686 cr (FY14) | Rs 38,424 cr (FY26) | ~3x | ~56x | NDA Stronger | The cleanest NDA win in this section and it survives every base-effect test: a 3x rise off a tiny base under P1 vs 56x under P2, with FY26 alone (+62.7% YoY) exceeding the entire P1 decade's cumulative exports (Rs 4,312 cr, 2004-14). Exports now reach 80+ countries, with the private sector contributing 45% — this is structural, not a one-off order. PIB — Defence exports record Rs 38,424 crore FY2025-26 / GlobalSecurity — early-2000s export values ($47M in 2002-03) / ORF — pre/post-2014 defence export decades compared |
| NEW | IAF Fighter Squadrons (sanctioned: 42) | ~39 | ~34 | 29 (Sept 2025, after MiG-21 retirement) | −5 squadrons | −5 squadrons | Mixed | A rare metric where both eras failed symmetrically: roughly 5 squadrons lost per decade, leaving the IAF at 29 — its lowest since the 1965 war and ~13 short of the 42 sanctioned for a two-front contingency. Blame is shared: the MMRCA tender stalled under P1; P2 trimmed Rafale to 36 jets and Tejas deliveries slipped. The 2003/2014 counts are approximations from defence-press reporting (peak was 41 in 1996), so chart with a tolerance band. The Week — 29 squadrons after MiG-21 retirement / GlobalSecurity — IAF fighter squadron history |
| NEW | LWE (Naxal)-Affected Districts (count) | ~76 (2004, first SRE list — unverified) | 126 | 11 (Dec 2025); 0 (Apr 2026) | +50 (expanded) | −126 (to zero) | NDA Stronger | The Red Corridor EXPANDED under P1 — the LWE map peaked around 2010 when the PM called Naxalism India's gravest internal security threat — then collapsed under P2 from 126 districts to zero, with MHA formally declaring no LWE-affected districts left in April 2026. The 2014→0 trajectory is MHA-official; the ~76 baseline for 2004 could not be re-verified and should be sourced from the MHA SRE archive before charting, or chart P2-only. Factly — zero LWE districts (2026) / MHA: India Naxal-free, districts 126 (2014) → 11 (2025) → 0 (2026) / Dataful — Red Corridor 126 districts at 2010 peak |
| NEW | Defence Production Value (Rs crore, annual) | n/a (comparable series begins 2014-15) | Rs 46,429 cr (2014-15) | Rs 1,78,000 cr (FY26) | n/a | +283% | NDA Stronger | Domestic defence output nearly quadrupled in nominal terms across P2 (Rs 46,429 cr → Rs 1.78 lakh cr, +15.6% in FY26 alone). No clean 2003-04 aggregate exists on the same basis (pre-corporatisation Ordnance Factory + DPSU accounting differs), so chart this as a P2-era metric or label P1 as data-unavailable rather than zero — deflate to real terms if comparing across the decade. PIB — record Rs 1.78 lakh crore defence production FY2025-26 / ORF — Rs 46,429 cr production in 2014-15 |
H. Security & Defence — Section Score (15 metrics)
10
NDA ↑
2
UPA ↑
2
Mixed
I. Governance & Institutions
| # | Metric | 2003 | 2014 | 2025/Latest | P1 Change (2003–14) | P2 Change (2014–25) | Verdict | Notes & Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 93 | Corruption Perception Index (CPI) Score (0–100) | 28/100Rank 83/133 (62nd %ile) | 38/100Rank 85/175 (49th %ile) | 39/100 (2025)Rank 91/182 (50th %ile) | +9 score pts; %ile 62→49 (improved) | +1 score pt; %ile 49→50 (flat) | UPA Stronger | Score is the right metric (more countries joined over time inflating ranks). UPA improved score dramatically (29→38, +9pts) while also improving percentile rank. NDA only managed +1pt in 11 years — other countries reformed faster. Percentile confirms UPA Stronger. Transparency International CPI ⟳ Aug 2026 update: CPI 2025 (released 10 Feb 2026): score 39, rank 91/182 — up 5 places from 96th, +1 pt vs 2024. Percentile now ~flat vs 2014 (49th→50th), slightly better than the published '52nd %ile worse' framing but verdict unchanged (UPA +9 pts vs NDA +1 pt). Minor v2003 fix: CPI 2003 India scored 2.8/10 = 28/100, not 29. · Transparency International CPI 2025 · Drishti IAS — CPI 2025 India summary |
| 94 | Press Freedom Index Rank (RSF) | ~105/168 (2006)(62nd %ile) | 140/180(78th %ile) | 157/180 (2026)(87th %ile) | %ile: 62→78 (−16pp) | %ile: 78→87 (−9pp) | Mixed | Verdict revised to Mixed — both eras worsened press freedom; neither has a clean record. P1 percentile worsened by 16pp (62nd → 78th). P2 worsened by 10pp (78th → 88th). The deterioration accelerated under UPA in relative terms — both eras contributed to the structural decline (journalist arrests, UAPA usage, media ownership concentration, government advertising as leverage). Neither era reversed the slide. RSF World Press Freedom Index ⟳ Aug 2026 update: RSF 2026 index: India 157/180, score 31.96 ('very serious' category), down 6 places from 151st in 2025 but slightly better than the 159th (2024) the article shows. P2 percentile deterioration revises from −10pp to −9pp — verdict Mixed unchanged. · The Wire — India 157th in RSF 2026 |
| 95 | Democracy Index — EIU Score (0–10) | 7.68 (2006, "Flawed Democracy") | 7.92 (2014) | ~6.96 (2025, "Flawed Democracy") | +0.24 | −0.96 | UPA Stronger | India downgraded from "Flawed Democracy" to "Hybrid Regime" in 2021. EIU cites civil liberties, press freedom, functioning of government. India disputes the classification. V-Dem (Sweden) also shows democratic backsliding. EIU Democracy Index ⟳ Aug 2026 update: Two factual errors fixed: (1) EIU has NEVER classified India as 'Hybrid Regime' — it has stayed 'Flawed Democracy' throughout; 'electoral autocracy' is V-Dem's label. (2) The 7.68 baseline is the 2006 score (index began 2006), not 2008. Latest: India scored 7.29 (rank 41) in the 2024 edition, then EIU's 2025 report (Feb 2026) records one of the year's biggest deteriorations at −0.33 → ~6.96. Exact 2025 score derived from EIU's stated decline, not read directly off the report — hence medium confidence. Verdict UPA Stronger unchanged and strengthened (P2 now −0.96 vs −0.70). · EIU Democracy Index 2025 release · EIU Democracy Index 2024 (India 7.29, rank 41) |
| 96 | Ease of Doing Business Rank (World Bank) | ~116/175 (2006)(66th %ile) | 142/189(75th %ile) | 63/190 (2020)*(33rd %ile) | %ile: 66→75 (−9pp, worsened) | %ile: 75→33 (+42pp, dramatic jump) | Mixed | Verdict revised to Mixed on methodology-dispute grounds. World Bank discontinued the EoDB index in 2021 after an internal investigation found data irregularities affecting multiple country rankings — India was implicated in the 2018–20 rounds (the same rounds that produced India's headline jump). Real GST, IBC, and regulatory reforms genuinely happened under NDA — but the EoDB rank specifically cannot be cited as clean evidence given the discontinuation. The directional improvement is real; the magnitude is contested. World Bank EoDB ⟳ Aug 2026 update: 63/190 (2020) remains the final-ever EoDB figure (index discontinued 2021). Flag for notes: the successor World Bank B-READY 2025 interim edition (101 economies) now INCLUDES India with per-theme scores (e.g. Business Entry) but publishes no single composite rank, so no comparable 'v2025' exists; full 184-economy edition due late 2026. Verdict Mixed unchanged. · World Bank B-READY 2025 · B-READY Business Entry score — India |
| 97 | Income Tax Returns Filed (millions) | ~30M | ~40M | ~92M (FY25) | +33% | +130% | NDA Stronger | GST + Aadhaar + UPI trails expanding the formal economy. Tax net widened significantly. CBDT Annual Report ⟳ Aug 2026 update: Actual replaces estimate: 9.19 crore (91.9M) ITRs filed for FY 2024-25, 8.64 crore e-verified as of 31 Mar 2025 (record year; 7.28 crore by the 31 Jul 2024 due date). P2 change +125% → +130%. Verdict NDA Stronger unchanged. · PIB — record 7.28 crore ITRs by 31 Jul 2024 · IT Dept — 9.1+ crore ITRs FY 2024-25 |
| 98 | UN E-Government Development Index Rank | ~113/191 (2005)(59th %ile) | 118/193(61st %ile) | 97/193 (2024)(50th %ile) | %ile: 59→61 (−2pp, flat) | %ile: 61→50 (+11pp) | NDA Stronger | UPA left e-governance percentile essentially flat (59th→61st). NDA improved 61st→54th %ile driven by Digital India, CoWIN, DigiLocker, UMANG, ONDC. Still below India's income-level peers — structural gap vs digital ambitions. UN E-Government Survey ⟳ Aug 2026 update: EGDI 2024 actual replaces 2022 figure: India rank 97/193, score 0.6678 — first time India cracks the top 100 and first time above the global average (0.6382). P2 percentile gain improves from +7pp to +11pp. Verdict NDA Stronger unchanged, strengthened. · UN EGOVKB — India country data |
| 99 | Supreme Court Pending Cases (millions) | ~30,000 (2004) — UNVERIFIED, see note | ~63,000 (2014) | 95,718 (Aug 2026, NJDG) | +49% | +52% (63k → 95.7k) | Mixed | District court pendency: ~46M cases (2024). Judicial delay is structural — both governments have failed to appoint enough judges. P2 marginally better on High Court vacancies. National Judicial Data Grid ⟳ Aug 2026 update: MAJOR ERROR: the published values (3.5M / 5.2M / 5.0M) are wrong by ~80x — Supreme Court pendency has never been in the millions; those figures are High-Court-scale. Verified actuals: ~50,000 (2009) rising to 66,000 (2013), dipping to ~63,000 (2014), and a 3-decade record 95,718 as of 1 Aug 2026 (breached 93,000 in Mar 2026). The ~2004 baseline (~30k) is from general knowledge, not a source found this session — verify before publishing (hence overall medium-not-high). Either fix the values as above, or relabel the row 'High Court Pending Cases': ~4.1M (2014) → 6.2–6.3M (2026). Verdict Mixed holds either way: both eras added ~33k SC cases; P1 worse in % terms off a low base, P2 set the absolute record. · Supreme Court Observer — 95,718 pending (Jul 2026) · Wikipedia SC of India — 50k (2009) → 66k (2013) → 63k (2014) · High Court pendency 62–63 lakh (2026) |
| 100 | RTI Applications Filed (millions, cumulative) | 0 (RTI Act: 2005) | ~17M cumulative | ~35M cumulative | Framework built | +106% | UPA Stronger | RTI usage grew but 2019 RTI Amendment weakened CIC independence. Backlog of RTI appeals at CICs has grown. Transparency activists flag structural weakening of the act. CIC (Central Information Commission) ⟳ Aug 2026 review: FLAG ONLY: could not verify the ~35M cumulative figure from any current source — no agency publishes an all-India cumulative RTI count (CIC covers only central public authorities, ~1.9M/yr). Values retained but treat as estimate; consider relabeling 'est.' in the cell. Verdict UPA Stronger unchanged. |
| 100a | Henley Passport Index — Visa-Free Countries (India passport) | ~52 countries (2006)Rank ~75/199 | ~52 countries (2014)Rank ~76/199 | 55 countries (Jul 2026)Rank 81/199 | Flat (+0) | +3 countries; rank 76→81 | Mixed | India's visa-free access increased by 6 countries under NDA (vs flat under UPA). However, the absolute rank worsened (76→82) as other countries — especially ASEAN and Gulf — expanded their passport power faster. India remains significantly behind peers like China (rank ~60, ~85 countries) despite larger GDP. Diplomatic visa reciprocity agreements haven't kept pace with India's economic clout. Verdict Mixed: slight improvement in access, relative position unchanged. Henley Passport Index ⟳ Aug 2026 update: July 2026 edition: India 81st with 55 visa-free destinations (index was volatile through 2026: 85th in Jan, 75th in Feb, 81st in Jul). Slightly weaker than the published ~58/rank 82 — P2 gain trimmed from +6 to +3 countries. Verdict Mixed unchanged; note the index's within-year volatility when charting. · Outlook Traveller — India 81st, Jul 2026 |
| 100b | Remittances Received (USD billion, annual) | ~$16B (2003) | ~$70B (2014) | ~$135.4B (FY25) | +$54B absolute | +$65B absolute | Mixed | India is the world's top remittance recipient (#1 globally since 2022). Both eras saw near-identical absolute dollar increases (~$54B and ~$55B). As % of GDP: 2.8% (2003) → 3.4% (2014) → 3.4% (2024) — flat under NDA. Remittances reflect Indian diaspora performance, not directly domestic policy. Verdict Mixed. World Bank Remittances Data ⟳ Aug 2026 update: Actual replaces estimate: record $135.4B in FY25 (RBI/World Bank; confirmed by Economic Survey Feb 2026), India #1 recipient globally, roughly 2x second-placed Mexico ($68B). P2 absolute gain now +$65B vs P1's +$54B, but as % of GDP still ~flat (~3.3%) — verdict Mixed unchanged. · PIB — $135.4B remittances FY25 · IBEF — India top remittance recipient FY25 |
| 100c | High Court Judicial Vacancy (% of sanctioned posts vacant) | ~30% (2004) | ~26% (2014) | ~31% (2026) | −4pp (improved) | +5pp (worsened) | UPA Stronger | Verdict based on absolute pp change: UPA reduced vacancies by 4pp; NDA allowed them to drift back up by 2pp. India has ~5,400 sanctioned High Court judge posts; only ~3,900 filled (2024). Judicial delay is endemic — 4.5 crore pending cases at all levels. Both governments failed to address structural judicial under-staffing. NJDG / Dept of Justice ⟳ Aug 2026 update: 2026 reporting puts HC judge vacancy at 30–33% of sanctioned strength — worse than the published ~28% (2024). P2 deterioration widens from +2pp to ~+5pp; verdict UPA Stronger unchanged, strengthened. ALSO FIX THE NOTES: sanctioned High Court strength is ~1,122 judges, not '~5,400 posts / ~3,900 filled' — those numbers conflate HC with district judiciary. · 2026 judicial backlog report — HC vacancy 30-33% |
| 100d | Prison Overcrowding Rate (% of sanctioned capacity) | ~110% (2003) — SUSPECT, likely understated; NCRB PSI reports from the early 2000s are commonly cited at ~139-141% | ~117% | 112.7% (2024) | +7pp (worsened) | −4.7pp (improved) | NDA Stronger | Verdict based on absolute pp deterioration: P1 worsened overcrowding by 7pp; P2 by 14pp. India's prisons hold ~5.5 lakh people against a capacity of ~4.2 lakh (2022). ~75% are undertrials — incarcerated without conviction. This is a structural failure of the justice system; verdict reflects which era worsened it more in absolute terms. NCRB Prison Statistics India ⟳ Aug 2026 update: v2025 was 2 reports stale: occupancy 131.4% (2022) → 120.8% (2023) → 112.7% (2024, PSI 2024 via NCRB). The 14pp two-year drop reverses the row's direction for P2. The 2003 baseline is the crux — resolve it from the original NCRB PSI 2003 PDF. · PSI 2024 — occupancy 112.7% · ThePrint — PSI 2023 occupancy 120.8% |
| 100e | Index of Economic Freedom — Score (Heritage Foundation, 0–100) | ~53.8 (2006) | 55.7 (2014) | 52.5 (2026)Rank 132; "Mostly Unfree" | +2.2 pts | −3.2 pts (with methodology caveat) | UPA Stronger | Verdict based on absolute score improvement: P1 +2.2 pts vs P2 +1.2 pts. Score is the right metric (country count has grown, making raw rank comparison unreliable). India remains in "Mostly Unfree" category (<60); both eras improved marginally. UPA's score jump was driven by deregulation, SEZs, and openness reforms. NDA's GST was transformative but partially offset by industrial licensing complexity and FDI restrictions in some sectors. Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom ⟳ Aug 2026 update: Published v2025 (~57.2 for 2024) is wrong — Heritage 2024/2025 scored India ~52.9-53.0 and the 2026 edition scores 52.5 (rank 132/29th in Asia-Pacific, −0.5 y/y; 2025 was already a 7-year low). v2014 corrected to the widely-cited 55.7. P2 now reads −3.2 pts — but Heritage's post-2022 methodology revisions depressed scores broadly, so keep a comparability caveat rather than hardening the verdict. Verdict UPA Stronger unchanged (directionally reinforced). v2003 (53.8, 2006) not independently re-verified — check if a source is handy. · Heritage 2026 — India country page (52.5, rank 132) · Mirrority — India IEF 2025 score 53 |
| 100f | Free Trade / CEPA Agreements Signed | 2 (2003–04) | 8+ comprehensive agreements | 5 new FTAs/CEPAs (2021–25): Mauritius, UAE, Australia, EFTA, UK | +6 agreements | +5 agreements (RCEP rejected) | Mixed | Verdict based on count: UPA signed ASEAN FTA (2009), South Korea CEPA (2010), Japan CEPA (2011), Malaysia CECA (2011), Sri Lanka, Singapore, Nepal, Bhutan — 6+ comprehensive multilateral/bilateral deals. NDA signed UAE CEPA (2022), Australia ECTA (2022), Mauritius CECPA (2021) but rejected RCEP (2019) — India's largest ever potential trade deal — citing domestic industry concerns. UK FTA ongoing since 2022. UPA Stronger on count; NDA's RCEP rejection may prove strategically correct given China-linked risks. Ministry of Commerce FTA List ⟳ Aug 2026 update: Row was written before UK CETA signing and EFTA entry-into-force. NDA tally now: Mauritius CECPA (2021), UAE CEPA (2022), Australia ECTA (2022), EFTA TEPA (2024), UK CETA (2025); EU FTA still under negotiation. · PIB — India-EFTA TEPA in force 1 Oct 2025 · EY — India-UK CETA signed Jul 2025 |
| 100g | Major International Summits Hosted / Diplomatic Firsts | CWG 2010; multiple bilateral summits | CWG 2010, BRICS, East Asia Summits | G20 Presidency 2023; Quad; SCO; Voice of Global South | Significant hosting | G20 — highest multilateral profile | Mixed | Verdict Mixed — both eras hosted major events and built diplomatic relationships. UPA: Commonwealth Games 2010, multiple bilateral + BRICS foundations. NDA: G20 Presidency 2023 (achieved joint communiqué incl. on Russia-Ukraine — diplomatic win), Quad leadership, Voice of Global South Summit (100+ nations), SCO chairmanship 2023. NDA has arguably elevated India's global diplomatic profile more, but UPA expanded regional relationships deeper. Ministry of External Affairs |
| NEW | Direct Benefit Transfer — Cumulative Funds Transferred (₹ lakh crore) | ₹0 (DBT launched Jan 2013) | ~₹0.07 lakh crore (₹7,400 cr, FY14) | ₹52.98 lakh crore cumulative (2026); est. gains ₹5.14 lakh crore | Framework piloted (Aadhaar 2009 + DBT pilot 2013) | ₹0.07 → ₹52.98 lakh crore | NDA Stronger | The cleanest e-governance win in the dataset: DBT scaled from a ₹7,400-crore pilot in FY14 to ₹52.98 lakh crore cumulatively transferred, with government-estimated leakage savings of ₹5.14 lakh crore from de-duplication and ghost-beneficiary removal. Attribution nuance: UPA built the rails (Aadhaar 2009, DBT pilot Jan 2013); NDA did the scaling — the 'estimated gains' figure is a government self-assessment, so treat the savings number as directional. DBT Bharat dashboard (₹52.98 lakh cr cumulative, ₹5.14 lakh cr est. gains) |
| NEW | Aadhaar Numbers Issued (crore, cumulative) | 0 (UIDAI created 2009) | ~63 crore (mid-2014) | 138.3 crore (Oct 2024) | 0 → ~63 crore in ~4 years of enrolment | +75 crore; >99.9% adult coverage by 2023 | Mixed | Base effects cut both ways: UPA went 0→63 crore in roughly four years of live enrolment — the fastest identity rollout in history — while NDA took it to near-universal coverage (99.9% of adults by May 2023), gave it statutory footing (Aadhaar Act 2016) and wired it into DBT/eKYC. One era built and proved the platform, the other universalized and operationalized it. The mid-2014 figure is the widely-cited UIDAI milestone but was not re-verified from a primary source this session. Aadhaar — 138.3 crore holders (Oct 2024) / UIDAI |
| NEW | Lok Sabha General Election Voter Turnout (%) | 58.07% (2004) | 66.44% (2014) | 66.1% (2024) | +8.4pp | −0.3pp (flat) | UPA Stronger | Turnout jumped 8.4pp across the UPA era (58.07% in 2004 → record 66.44% in 2014, aided by ECI reforms, voter-roll expansion and higher women's participation), then plateaued under NDA (66.1% in 2024, −1.3pp vs 2019 — though with the highest-ever absolute women's participation at 312M). Caveat for the chart: the 2014 election sits exactly on the P1/P2 boundary and turnout is an electorate behavior, not a pure government output. 2004 general election — turnout 58.07% / 2014 general election — turnout 66.44% / 2024 general election — turnout 66.1% |
| NEW | Women MPs in Lok Sabha (seats won) | 45 (2004, 8.3%) | 62 (2014, 11.4%) | 74 (2024, ~14%) | +17 seats (+3.1pp) | +12 seats (+2.2pp) | Mixed | Glacial progress in both eras: women's share of the Lok Sabha rose ~3pp per decade regardless of who governed, and 2024 actually fell 4 seats vs 2019 (78→74). NDA legislated the Women's Reservation Act (2023, 33% quota) but deferred implementation past the next delimitation — a law on paper, not yet a seat in the House. The 2024 figure (74, ~14%) is web-verified; the 2004/2014 counts are standard ECI/PRS figures but were not re-verified from a live source this session. 18th Lok Sabha — 74 women MPs (~14%) / Election Commission of India statistical reports |
I. Governance & Institutions — Section Score (19 metrics)
4
NDA ↑
7
UPA ↑
6
Mixed
J. Environment
| # | Metric | 2003 | 2014 | 2025/Latest | P1 Change (2003–14) | P2 Change (2014–25) | Verdict | Notes & Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 101 | Forest Cover (million hectares) | 67.8 | 70.2 (2015 SFR) | 71.5 (ISFR 2023, latest) | +2.5M ha | +1.3M ha | UPA Stronger | SFR 2023 recorded 71.6M ha. Projecting ~72.6 by 2025. P2 (70.2→72.6 = +2.4M ha) and P1 (67.7→70.2 = +2.5M ha) are essentially identical — verdict Mixed. Note: "forest cover" includes plantations; natural forest loss continues in biodiversity-rich areas. FSI State of Forest Report ⟳ Aug 2026 update: No ISFR 2025 published as of Aug 2026 (report is biennial; ISFR 2023 released Dec 2024 remains latest). The '~72.6 proj. 2025' figure must be dropped; ISFR 2003 actual was 678,333 sq km = 67.8M ha (row had 67.7). · FSI ISFR 2023 · PIB — ISFR 2023 release |
| 102 | CO₂ Emissions per Capita (tonnes/person) | 1.0 | 1.6 | 2.2 (2024) | +42% (worse) | +34% (worse) | NDA Stronger | Still very low vs global average (4.7t). Emissions per capita are growing — renewable push has slowed the rate of increase in P2. Our World in Data / IEA ⟳ Aug 2026 update: Both published baselines were wrong vs OWID/Global Carbon Budget series: 2003 = 0.96t (not 1.2), 2014 = 1.64t (not 1.7), 2024 = 2.20t (not ~1.9). Corrected changes: P1 +71% vs P2 +34% — NDA-era growth is still slower, so verdict 'NDA Stronger' survives, but P2's '+12%' was a large understatement. Still ~half the world average (~4.7t). · Our World in Data / Global Carbon Budget 2024 · OWID India CO2 profile |
| 103 | Air Quality — PM2.5 (Delhi annual mean, μg/m³) | ~140 | ~150 (WHO database, 2013-14) | 82.2 (New Delhi, 2025 — IQAir WAQR 2025) | +14% (worse) | −45% (cross-dataset) | Mixed | Verdict revised to Mixed. Earlier "UPA Stronger" verdict was misattributed — the data actually shows UPA worsened the metric (+14%) while NDA marginally improved it (−3%). However, the NDA improvement (5 μg/m³) is within annual measurement noise, and the absolute level (155 μg/m³) remains 31× the WHO limit (5 μg/m³). Neither era meaningfully changed the structural problem. NCAP (2019) targets 40% reduction by 2026 from 2017 baseline. Overall India ranks among world's most polluted countries. CPCB / IQAir World Air Quality Report ⟳ Aug 2026 update: Published '~155 (2023)' does not match IQAir's series (Delhi 2023 was ~92-100 μg/m³); the row mixes an older WHO/CPCB-style series with IQAir. v2003 '~140' is unverifiable — Delhi had essentially no systematic PM2.5 monitoring in 2003 (low confidence, consider footnoting as modelled/estimated). India's 2025 population-weighted mean: 48.9 μg/m³, world rank 6th. ⟳ Editorial decision (Aug 2026 refresh): Kept Mixed: the apparent ~45% improvement spans two different monitoring datasets (WHO/CPCB vs IQAir), and the 2003 value is modelled — Delhi had no systematic PM2.5 monitoring then. · IQAir World Air Quality Report 2025 · WAQR 2025 summary (New Delhi 82.2) |
| 104 | India NDC Commitment — Renewable % of capacity by 2030 | — | ~2015: pledged 40% | 50% non-fossil capacity achieved Jul 2025 (242.8 GW of 484.8 GW) — 5 years early | — | Both 40% and 50% targets met years early | NDA Stronger | India met its Paris Agreement NDC target (40% non-fossil power capacity) 9 years early. New target: 50% by 2030. UNFCCC India NDC 2022 ⟳ Aug 2026 update: Major update: on 14 Jul 2025 India crossed 50% of installed power capacity from non-fossil sources (RE 184.6 GW + large hydro 49.4 GW + nuclear 8.8 GW), hitting the upgraded 2030 NDC goal five years ahead. The old cell ('40% achieved by 2023') is superseded. Verdict NDA Stronger unchanged. · PIB — 50% non-fossil milestone · Down To Earth, Jul 2025 |
| 105 | Wetlands Notified under Ramsar (count) | 19 (2003) | 26 (2014) | 101 (Aug 2026) | +7 | +75 | NDA Stronger | India has world's 4th most Ramsar sites. Ramsar Convention ⟳ Aug 2026 update: Count moved 80 (2024) -> 91 (Jun 2025) -> 96 (Dec 2025) -> 101 (Glaw Lake, Arunachal, designated 3 Aug 2026). v2003 label fixed: 19 sites was the 2003 count, not 2005 (India had 25-26 by 2005-06). Verdict NDA Stronger unchanged, margin widens. · Ramsar Convention — India · Ramsar sites in India 2026 (101) |
| NEW | Tiger Population (NTCA All-India Estimation) | 1,411 (2006, first camera-trap census) | 2,226 | 3,682 (2022, latest; 2026 cycle underway) | +58% (2006–14) | +65% (2014–22) | Mixed | Growth rates are nearly identical across eras (+58% vs +65% over 8-year windows), and the scientific camera-trap methodology itself was instituted under UPA in 2006 — the older 2002 pugmark count (~3,600) is considered unreliable and shouldn't anchor P1. Absolute gains favour NDA (+1,456 vs +815), but that's the base effect of a compounding recovery. NTCA All India Tiger Estimation 2022 / 1,411 (2006) to 3,682 (2022) |
| NEW | Asiatic Lion Population (Gujarat census) | 359 (2005) | 523 (2015) | 891 (2025, 16th census) | +46% (2005–15) | +70% (2015–25) | NDA Stronger | Growth accelerated in P2 (+368 lions vs +164) despite a larger base — genuinely faster, not a base effect. Caveat: lion conservation is substantially a Gujarat state programme predating both eras; the entire wild population also remains confined to one landscape (single-epidemic risk). Mongabay — census series 2001–2025 / 16th Asiatic Lion Census 2025 (891) |
| NEW | Leopard Population (national estimate) | — | 7,910 (2015 est., tiger-range forests) | 13,874 (2022) | — | +75% | NDA Stronger | No national scientific estimate existed before 2014-15, so P1 can't be scored. The +75% P2 rise is real but inflated by expanding survey coverage across cycles — the 2018 estimate (12,852) suggests much of the jump is better counting, not just more leopards. Status of Leopards in India reports (2015/2022) / NTCA monitoring |
| NEW | Solar Installed Capacity (GW) | ~0 (negligible grid solar) | 2.6 (Mar 2014) | ~161 (Jun 2026; crossed 150 GW Apr 2026) | +2.6 GW | +158 GW (~60×) | NDA Stronger | The single largest environmental delta between the eras: 2.6 GW -> ~161 GW, with a record ~45 GW added in FY2026 alone. Fair caveat: global solar module costs collapsed ~90% after 2010, so every country's curve bent — but India's scale-up (3rd-largest solar fleet) outpaced most peers. pv magazine — FY2026 record, 150 GW crossed / DTE — RE 288 GW, solar ~56% (Jun 2026) |
| NEW | EV Share of New Vehicle Registrations (%) | ~0 | ~0.1 (negligible; pre-FAME) | 8.6 (FY2025-26, Vahan) | ≈0 | +8.5 pp | NDA Stronger | 2.55 million EVs sold in FY2025-26 = 8.6% of all registrations, led by electric 3-wheelers (31% penetration) and 2-wheelers; e-cars still only 4.5%. The category barely existed in 2014 (FAME-I launched 2015), so P1 has nothing to score — a genuinely new-era metric, like UPI in the digital section. JMK Research — FY2026 EV penetration / EVreporter — 25.5 lakh EVs, 8.64% |
| NEW | Urban Municipal Solid Waste Processed (%) | — | ~17-18 | ~80 (2025, MoHUA) | — | +62 pp | NDA Stronger | MoHUA reports urban waste processing rose from ~17% (2014) to ~80% (2025) under Swachh Bharat-Urban, with 58% of legacy landfill waste remediated. Caveat: the 80% is installed processing *capacity* self-reported by cities; independent audits find actual processing lower — direction is unambiguous, magnitude less so. MoHUA — 16% to 80.17% / SBM-U — 17% (2014) to 76%+ |
J. Environment — Section Score (11 metrics)
8
NDA ↑
0
UPA ↑
2
Mixed
K. Society — Top and Bottom
This section looks at how India's richest and poorest have fared. Growth is necessary but not sufficient — who captured that growth matters.
| # | Metric | 2003 | 2014 | 2025/Latest | P1 Change (2003–14) | P2 Change (2014–25) | Verdict | Notes & Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 106 | India Billionaires — Count (Forbes) | 13 | 56 | 229 (Forbes 2026) | +331% | +309% | Mixed | Both periods saw billionaire class expand dramatically. Top 5 Indians own more than bottom 50% combined. Forbes India Rich List ⟳ Aug 2026 update: Forbes 2026 World's Billionaires list (Mar 2026): record 229 Indians, up from 205 in 2025; total wealth >$1 trillion. Replaces the '~200 (2024)' estimate. P1 +331% vs P2 +309% — verdict Mixed still holds. · Forbes India — record 229 Indians on 2026 list · Forbes — India's 10 Richest 2026 |
| 107 | Top 10% Income Share (% of national income) | ~52% | ~56-57% | ~58% (2024, WIR 2026) | +3pp (more unequal) | +1-2pp (roughly stable) | NDA Stronger | Both eras saw rising inequality. India's top 10% captured a growing share of income in both decades. World Inequality Database ⟳ Aug 2026 update: Published v2025 (~60%) overstated; WIR 2026 puts top 10% at ~58% of national income in 2024. Published v2014 (~55%) understated — WIL series has ~56-57% by 2014-15. Corrected trajectory flips the verdict (old verdict rewarded UPA for a smaller rise that the revised data no longer shows). · WIL WP 2024/09 — Income & Wealth Inequality in India 1922-2023 · WIR 2026 coverage — top 10% get 58% of income |
| 108 | Bottom 50% Income Share (% of national income) | ~16% | ~15% | ~15% (2024, WIR 2026) | −1pp | ~0pp (stable) | Mixed | Bottom half of India's population earns a declining share of national income across both eras. Absolute incomes rose, but relative share fell. World Inequality Database (WID) ⟳ Aug 2026 update: Published v2025 (~13%) is wrong per latest WIL data — bottom 50% earn ~15% of national income in 2024 (same as 2022-23's 15.0% in the WIL 2024 paper). The 'declining share under NDA' premise behind the UPA Stronger verdict no longer holds. · WIL WP 2024/09 · WIR 2026 — bottom 50% earn 15% of national income |
| 109 | Gini Coefficient — Income vs Wealth (0=equal, 1=max) | Income ~0.37Wealth ~0.74 | Income ~0.38Wealth ~0.77 | Consumption ~0.255 (WB, 2022-23)Wealth ~0.83 (2024) | Slight rise income | Sharp rise wealth | Mixed | Two very different pictures depending on which Gini you use. Income Gini (World Bank): India is among the world's 4th most equal countries by income distribution (~0.35), and has marginally improved under NDA — driven by DBT, rural welfare schemes, and MGNREGA continuity. Wealth Gini (~0.83) tells the opposite story: top 1% own 40% of wealth. However, the wealth inequality surge is a global phenomenon — driven by asset price inflation (stocks, real estate) post-2014 which lifted rich households everywhere. India's wealth Gini rise mirrors USA, UK, and China. Income equality is the fairer governance measure; wealth inequality is partly structural. WID / World Bank Gini ⟳ Aug 2026 update: Label fix, not a new number: the World Bank's headline 25.5 Gini (basis of the 'India among most equal' claim) is a CONSUMPTION Gini from HCES 2022-23, not an income Gini of ~0.35. World Bank API confirms SI.POV.GINI = 25.5 (2022), down from 28.8 (2011). Income Ginis (WID-based) are far higher (~0.47+) — the note should not conflate the two. Verdict Mixed unchanged. |
| 110 | Unemployment Rate — CMIE (%, annual avg) | ~7% (2004-05 NSSO) | ~4.9% (PLFS 2014) | PLFS 2025: 3.1% (usual status)CMIE ~7-8% | Declined | Rose | Mixed | Highly contested data. PLFS (govt survey) shows 3.2% (2022-23). CMIE shows 7-9%. Demonetisation (2016), GST transition, and COVID contributed to job losses. Urban youth unemployment particularly elevated. CMIE / PLFS (MoSPI) ⟳ Aug 2026 update: Refreshed with PLFS Annual Report Jan-Dec 2025 (released Aug 2026): UR 3.1%, LFPR 59.3%. Could not verify a current CMIE 2025 annual average (site paywalled); CMIE figure kept as ~7-8% with low confidence. The CMIE-PLFS divergence itself is the story. ⟳ Editorial decision (Aug 2026 refresh): Verdict revised to Mixed: official PLFS shows unemployment declining to 3.1% (Jan–Dec 2025) while CMIE's private series says ~7-8% — the CMIE-vs-PLFS divergence is itself the story; neither series alone supports an era verdict. · PIB — PLFS Annual Report Jan-Dec 2025 · PLFS 2025 key findings summary |
| 111 | Female Labour Force Participation Rate (%) | ~26% | ~23% (2013-14) | 41.7% (PLFS 2023-24)40.0% (PLFS 2025, new methodology) | −3pp (worse) | +18pp | NDA Stronger | Dramatic reversal — fLFPR had been falling since 2005. Post-2019 rise partly driven by rural female self-employment (farming, MGNREGA). Urban FLFPR still very low (~22%). ILO: ILO ILOSTAT ⟳ Aug 2026 update: Replaces '~37% (PLFS 2023)' with actuals: FLFPR hit 41.7% in PLFS 2023-24, then reads 40.0% in the redesigned calendar-year PLFS 2025 (not directly comparable — methodology and reference period changed Jan 2025). Verdict NDA Stronger unchanged; rise remains dramatic vs ~23% in 2013-14. · PIB — PLFS 2023-24 (female LFPR 41.7%) · PIB — PLFS Annual Report 2025 (female LFPR 40.0%) |
| 112 | Women in Parliament — Lok Sabha (%) | 8.3% (2004) | 11.4% (2014) | 13.6% (2024) | +3.1pp | +2.2pp | Mixed | Women's Reservation Bill passed 2023 (33% seats reserved) — implementation awaits delimitation post-2026 Census. Both eras made incremental progress. Global avg: 26.5%. Lok Sabha Secretariat / IPU Parline |
| 113 | Crimes Against Women — Registered (thousands, annual) | ~143k | ~338k | ~448k (2023) | +136% | +33% | Mixed | The sharp P1 increase is partly better reporting (post-Nirbhaya, 2012). P2 increase is more gradual. Difficult to separate actual incidence from reporting rates. Both need improvement. NCRB Crime in India Report ⟳ Aug 2026 update: NCRB Crime in India 2023 (released Sep 2025): 4,48,211 cases registered, up from 4,45,256 (2022); rate 66.2 per lakh female population. Replaces the 2022 figure. Verdict Mixed unchanged. · NCRB 2023 — 4.48 lakh crimes against women |
| 115 | Child Marriage Rate (% girls married before age 18) | 47.4% (NFHS-3, 2005-06) | 26.8% (NFHS-4, 2015-16) | 20.1% (NFHS-6, 2023-24) | −20pp | −6.7pp | UPA Stronger | Verdict based on absolute pp reduction: P1 reduced child marriage by 20pp — one of the largest declines globally in a decade, driven by MGNREGA (girls in school longer), mid-day meals, and conditional cash transfers. P2 reduced by ~4pp (projected to 2025). Rate has plateaued — further reduction needs structural change in BIMARU states. NFHS-4 & NFHS-5 ⟳ Aug 2026 update: NFHS-6 fact sheets (released May 2026) replace the projection: women 20-24 married before 18 fell 47.4% → 26.8% → 23.3% → 20.1% across NFHS-3/4/5/6. P1 −20.6pp still dwarfs P2 −6.7pp — verdict UPA Stronger unchanged, though the 'plateaued' claim in the note should be softened (decline resumed). · SBI Research — NFHS-6 results (child marriage 20.1%) · NFHS official (IIPS) |
| 116 | LGBTQ+ Rights — Section 377 Legal Status | Criminalized (IPC 377) | HC decriminalized 2009 → SC re-criminalized 2013 (UPA era, SC's call) | SC permanently decriminalized 2018; marriage equality denied 2023 | Net backward (SC re-criminalized end of P1) | Permanent decriminalization achieved | Mixed | Verdict Mixed — both eras had progress and setbacks. UPA: Delhi HC read down 377 (2009, positive), but SC reversed it in 2013 (setback — SC decision, not government, but UPA didn't aggressively challenge). NDA: SC permanently decriminalized Section 377 in 2018 (Navtej Johar). But NDA govt opposed marriage equality in court (2023 SC judgment). Net outcome: decriminalization happened under NDA (factually better final position in P2), but full equality blocked. Supreme Court of India |
| 117 | Olympic Medals — Summer Olympics (total per era) | — | 10 medalsAthens 2004: 1, Beijing 2008: 3, London 2012: 6 | 15 medalsRio 2016: 2, Tokyo 2020: 7, Paris 2024: 6 | +10 medals in era | +15 medals in era | NDA Stronger | Verdict based on total medals won during each era: NDA era covered 3 Olympics and produced 15 medals (incl. Tokyo 2020 — India's best-ever, 7 medals, first-ever athletics gold: Neeraj Chopra javelin). UPA era: 10 medals across 3 Olympics. Khelo India (2018), TOP Scheme (Targets Olympic Podium), National Sports Education Board contributed. Medal trajectory is strongly upward. IOC / Indian Olympic Association |
| 118 | International Tourist Arrivals (millions, annual) | ~2.7M (2003) | ~7.7M (2014) | 9.0M (2025)2024: 9.7M; pre-COVID peak: 10.9M (2019) | +5.0M absolute | +1.3M raw+3.2M to 2019 pre-COVID | Mixed | Verdict Mixed: P1 added 5.0M in absolute terms — clearly stronger on raw numbers. P2 was decimated by COVID (2020-22: near-zero arrivals), making direct comparison unfair — same logic as not penalizing UPA for GFC. Pre-COVID trajectory (2014→2019: +3.2M in 5 years) shows comparable annual growth. NDA: e-Visa expansion (2014-16 simplified dramatically), Incredible India 2.0, medical tourism growth. COVID asymmetry makes this Mixed. Ministry of Tourism / UNWTO ⟳ Aug 2026 update: Full-year actuals: FTAs were 9.7M in 2024 (not ~9.2M — that was the 2023 figure) and fell 9.4% to ~9.0M in 2025 (IBEF cites 9.15M), still below the 2019 peak of 10.9M. Weakens the NDA recovery story slightly but COVID-asymmetry logic keeps verdict Mixed. · CAPA — 9M FTAs in 2025, down 9.4% · IBEF — 9.15M FTAs 2025 |
| 119 | Electricity Access — Household Coverage (%) | ~60% (2004-05) | ~88.5% (2014) | ~99.9% population access (WB 2024)household ~97.8% | +28.5pp | +11pp | NDA Stronger | P1's headline pp-gain looks larger (28.5pp vs 9.3pp), but the metric has a hard 100% ceiling and NDA achieved near-universal coverage (97.8%). The last-mile pp at the top of the curve is structurally far harder than the same pp at the middle. Saubhagya scheme electrified 26M previously unconnected households (2017–19) — the structurally hardest cohort (remote, hilly, tribal). UPA built scale to 88.5%; NDA closed the gap to ceiling — the latter is the policy achievement on this metric. GARV Dashboard / NFHS-4/5 ⟳ Aug 2026 update: World Bank (EG.ELC.ACCS.ZS) now shows 99.9% population access in 2024 (65.4% in 2003, 85.1% in 2014 — close to the row's household-basis figures). NFHS-6 fact sheets omitted household electricity, so household basis stays ~97.8%. Verdict NDA Stronger unchanged. · World Bank — access to electricity, India |
| 120 | LPG / Clean Cooking Fuel — Household Coverage (%) | ~22% (2004-05) | ~44% (2014) | ~75% (2024)NFHS-5: 58.6% primary fuel; incl. LPG subsidised | +22pp | +31pp | NDA Stronger | Verdict based on absolute pp added: P2 +31pp vs P1 +22pp. NDA's Pradhan Mantri Ujjwala Yojana (PMUY, 2016) released 10 crore free LPG connections to BPL women — the largest clean cooking fuel programme ever. P2 started from a higher base (44%) and still added more pp. Indoor air pollution from biomass cooking is one of India's leading preventable health risks — this is a genuine bottom-of-pyramid impact. PMUY Dashboard / NFHS-4/5 ⟳ Aug 2026 update: Value kept (~75%, 2024) but could not be refreshed: NFHS-6 fact sheets deliberately excluded clean-cooking-fuel data (govt says it is tracked via Swachh Survekshan/MoSPI surveys). Update the note text: PMUY connections now 10.33 crore (Jul 2025), not '10 crore'; Rs 12,000 crore subsidy continued for FY26 plus 25 lakh additional connections approved. · PIB — PMUY subsidy FY26, 10.33 crore connections · PIB — 25 lakh additional PMUY connections FY26 |
| 121 | Mobile Phone Ownership — Households with phone (%) | ~18% (2004-05) | ~84% (2014) | ~97% (2024)NFHS-5: 95.9% | +66pp | +13pp | NDA Stronger | P1's headline pp-gain (+66pp) is from a virgin market with a hard 100% household ceiling. P2 closed the remaining 13pp to ~97% — the structurally hardest cohort (deeply rural, low-income, last-mile). The metric cannot exceed 100% of households. NDA's contribution: Digital India / BharatNet to gram panchayats, Jio's data revolution enabled by P2 spectrum policy, JAM stack for DBT delivery. Reaching near-universal household phone ownership is the policy achievement here, regardless of which era had more pp room to grow. NFHS-4/5 / TRAI |
| 122 | Bank Account Ownership — Households with account (%) | ~35% (2004-05) | ~68% (2014) | ~99% (2025)PMJDY: 58.8 crore accounts (Jul 2026); NFHS-6: 89% of women have own account | +33pp | +31pp | NDA Stronger | P1 added 33pp from a 35% base; P2 added 29pp but closed the gap to a hard 100% household ceiling (97% reached). The last-mile pp at the top of the curve is structurally harder than the same pp at the middle (remaining unbanked households are deeply rural, low-income, or migrant). PMJDY (2014) opened 51 crore zero-balance accounts — the largest financial inclusion programme globally per Guinness. Aadhaar-linked DBT cut ~₹2.2 lakh crore in leakage. Reaching near-universal household banking is the structural policy achievement on this metric. PMJDY Dashboard / NFHS-4/5 ⟳ Aug 2026 update: PMJDY dashboard actuals: 58.77 crore beneficiaries and ~Rs 3.12 lakh crore deposits as of mid-Jul 2026 (row said '51+ crore by 2024'); 27 states/UTs report 100% household banking coverage, remainder >99%. NFHS-6 corroborates: 89.0% of women now have their own account (vs 15.1% in 2005-06). Verdict NDA Stronger unchanged. · PMJDY 58.6+ crore accounts, Rs 3.08 lakh crore deposits (Jul 2026) |
| 123 | Refrigerator Ownership — Households with fridge (%) | ~15% (2004-05) | ~34% (2014) | ~50% (HCES 2023-24) | +19pp | +16pp | Mixed | Verdict Mixed: P1 +19pp vs P2 +16pp (projected to 2025) — comparable. Both eras saw steady rise in consumer durables ownership. Fridge ownership is a strong proxy for middle-class emergence and cold chain expansion. Driven by falling appliance prices (China manufacturing cost pass-through), rural electrification enabling usage, and rising disposable incomes in both periods. NFHS-4/5 / HCES 2022-23 (MoSPI) ⟳ Aug 2026 update: Projection confirmed by actuals: Household Consumption Expenditure Survey data (via Data For India) shows nearly half of households owned a refrigerator by 2024. Drop the '(proj.)' tag. Verdict Mixed unchanged. · Data For India — household assets (HCES 2024) |
| 124 | Television Ownership — Households with TV (%) | ~47% (2004-05) | ~66% (2014) | ~67% (HCES 2023-24) | +19pp | +1pp | Mixed | Verdict Mixed: P1 was stronger on absolute pp (+19pp vs +9pp). The TV era effectively reached saturation — with OTT and mobile screens replacing the TV set as the primary media consumption device, especially in urban areas. P2's lower TV penetration gain partly reflects mobile phone substitution (many rural households skipped TV for smartphone screens). Saturation effect and technology substitution make raw PP comparison less meaningful here. NFHS-4/5 ⟳ Aug 2026 update: The ~75% projection was too high: HCES 2024 data (via Data For India) shows about two-thirds of households own a TV — essentially flat vs 2014 (~66%), confirming the smartphone-substitution/saturation thesis already in the note. P2 change drops from +9pp to ~+1pp; verdict Mixed still fits (saturation makes pp comparison meaningless). · Data For India — household assets (HCES 2024) ⟳ Gap-closure analysis (Aug 2026): The saturation rule is NOT applied here: TV ownership is consumer adoption, not a universal-coverage program, and the flat P2 number reflects smartphone/OTT substitution as much as affordability — the 100% ceiling assumption breaks down after ~2015. Mixed stands. |
| 125 | Two-Wheeler Ownership — Households with motorcycle/scooter (%) | ~30% (2004-05) | ~53% (2014) | ~65% (proj. 2025)Actual: ~62% (NFHS-5, 2019-21) | +23pp | +12pp (proj.) | Mixed | Verdict Mixed: P1 +23pp vs P2 +12pp. P1's larger gain reflects India's motorcycle revolution — urbanization, falling credit costs (NBFC expansion), and strong domestic manufacturing. P2 gain is lower partly due to base effect (53% is a harder base than 30%), and urban youth increasingly adopting ride-sharing (Ola/Uber) as a substitute. Both eras saw continued expansion of mobility access for lower-middle-income households. Bottom-line: poor households can today afford a motorbike in both periods; NDA sustained the trajectory. NFHS-4/5 / SIAM ⟳ Aug 2026 review: Could not verify the ~65% projection or the '~62% (NFHS-5)' actual — NFHS-6 fact sheets omit asset ownership, HCES summaries reviewed cover TV/fridge/AC/washing machine only, and the NFHS-5 fact-sheet URL has moved. NFHS-5's published motorcycle/scooter figure may be lower than 62% (widely cited ~55%); recommend re-checking the NFHS-5 national report before republishing. Flagged, no change asserted. |
| NEW | Urbanization — Urban Population (% of total) | 28.5% | 32.2% | 35.7% (2025) | +3.8pp | +3.5pp | Equal | Urbanization is a slow structural tide that barely responds to which coalition holds Delhi — almost identical pp gains in both eras (+3.8 vs +3.5). India remains far less urbanized than China (~65%), which caps agglomeration-driven productivity gains regardless of government. World Bank / UN WUP series. World Bank — urban population % (India) |
| NEW | Air Passengers Carried — Indian carriers (millions, annual) | 19.5M | 82.7M | 180.4M (2023) | +324% (+63M) | +118% (+98M) | Mixed | P1's 4x growth came off a tiny base and rode the LCC revolution (Air Deccan 2003, IndiGo/SpiceJet 2005-06 — all UPA-era entrants). P2 added more absolute flyers (+98M vs +63M) despite two near-zero COVID years, helped by UDAN regional connectivity and 80+ new airports. Percentage favours UPA, absolute favours NDA — classic base-effect stalemate. World Bank/ICAO series (registered-carrier passengers); DGCA domestic-only counts show the same shape. World Bank/ICAO — air passengers carried, India |
| NEW | Internet Users (% of population) | 1.7% | 13.5% | 70% (2025) | +11.8pp | +56.5pp | NDA Stronger | The single largest digital-inclusion jump anywhere in the world: +56.5pp under P2 vs +11.8pp under P1. Unlike the ceiling-constrained metrics, P2 here had both the harder base AND the bigger gain — driven by the Jio price collapse (2016, world's cheapest data), 4G rollout and Digital India stack. P1 laid telecom groundwork but internet stayed an urban elite good until 2014. Check for overlap with any digital/tech section before adding. World Bank/ITU — internet users % (India) |
| NEW | Women with Own Bank Account (% of women 15-49) | 15.1% (NFHS-3, 2005-06) | 53.0% (NFHS-4, 2015-16) | 89.0% (NFHS-6, 2023-24) | +37.9pp | +36.0pp | NDA Stronger | Raw pp gains are nearly identical (+37.9 vs +36.0), but by the section's own ceiling logic P2's climb from 53% to 89% — reaching the hardest-to-bank cohort of rural, low-literacy women via PMJDY's women-first design (55.7% of Jan Dhan accounts are women's) — is the steeper achievement. Financial agency for women, not just household access, is the bottom-of-pyramid metric that changed fastest. NFHS-3/4/6 series. SBI Research — NFHS-6 (women's own bank account 89%) / NFHS official (IIPS) |
K. Society (Top & Bottom) — Section Score (23 metrics)
9
NDA ↑
5
UPA ↑
9
Mixed
L. Manufacturing & Industry
India's aspiration to become a global manufacturing hub has been a recurring policy priority. This section tracks what actually moved — in share of GDP, in absolute output, in defence exports, and in foreign investment attracted.
| # | Metric | 2003 | 2014 | 2025/Latest | P1 Change (2003–14) | P2 Change (2014–25) | Verdict | Notes & Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| L1 | Manufacturing as % of GDP | ~15.6% (2003) | ~15.1% (2014) | ~13.1% (2024) | −1.8pp | −1.9pp | UPA Stronger | Verdict revised to Mixed — both eras failed to grow manufacturing's share. P1 −1.8pp vs P2 −1.5pp is a 0.3pp gap (within similar-magnitudes noise) and the direction is wrong in both eras. Earlier "UPA Stronger" verdict was actually misattributed — by absolute change P2 declined slightly less. Either way, manufacturing's share has fallen for two decades. NDA's Make in India target of 25% by 2022 was missed badly. Services sector growth has structurally outpaced manufacturing across both eras. The PLI scheme is showing early sector-specific results (mobiles, semis) but the headline share number hasn't moved. World Bank MVA / MoSPI ⟳ Aug 2026 update: Verified directly against World Bank API (NV.IND.MANF.ZS): 2003 = 15.59%, 2014 = 15.07%, 2024 = 13.14%. Published 2003 value (~16.7%) is incorrect — no year near 2003 shows 16.7% (the 17%+ peak came 2006-2010, inside P1). p1_change should read −0.5pp. Caveat for notes: MoSPI rebased national accounts to 2022-23 (Feb 2026) and says the new series shows 'no significant change' in manufacturing share; World Bank still reports the comparable long series. · World Bank API — Manufacturing VA % of GDP, India |
| L2 | Manufacturing Value Added — Absolute (₹ Lakh Crore, constant prices) | ~₹6 L Cr (2003) | ~₹14 L Cr (2014) | ~₹28 L Cr (2024) | +₹8 L Cr | +₹14 L Cr | NDA Stronger | Verdict based on absolute INR added in manufacturing output (constant prices). P2 added ₹14 lakh crore in real manufacturing value — nearly double P1's addition of ₹8 lakh crore. This is the correct comparison: absolute rupee-value of output added to the economy. The share declining doesn't negate that real manufacturing output doubled. PLI for mobile phones (Apple, Samsung now assembled in India), defence manufacturing, chemical plants, and pharma API production all contributed. MoSPI National Accounts ⟳ Aug 2026 update: Flag, not a value change: MoSPI rebased National Accounts from 2011-12 to 2022-23 base (released Feb 2026), so the '₹28 L Cr (2024)' figure is now on a discontinued series — the row should say '2011-12 series'. Directionally the verdict holds and strengthens: government reports manufacturing GVA real CAGR of 10.88% over FY23-FY26 under the revised series. Could not extract an exact FY26 constant-price manufacturing GVA from the MoSPI PE press note (PDF text not machine-readable); recommend manual pull before charting a new endpoint. · MoSPI PE FY2025-26 press note · Manufacturing GVA CAGR 10.88% FY23-FY26 (revised series) |
| L3 | Defence Exports (₹ Crore, annual) | ~₹400 Cr (2004-05) | ~₹686 Cr (2013-14) | ₹38,424 Cr (2025-26) | +₹286 Cr | +₹37,738 Cr (~56x) | NDA Stronger | Verdict based on absolute growth in defence exports: NDA era represents a 28x increase — from ₹686 crore (FY14) to ₹21,083 crore (FY25). India now exports to 85+ countries including USA (EW kits), France (Pinaka rockets), Philippines (BrahMos cruise missiles). NDA set targets: ₹35,000 crore by FY25 (partially achieved). Key policy drivers: DPP reforms, FDI in defence to 74%, iDEX (innovation ecosystem), and mandatory 68 items reserved for domestic production. P1's exports were negligible. Ministry of Defence / DDP Annual Report ⟳ Aug 2026 update: Big jump: FY26 defence exports hit an all-time high of ₹38,424 Cr, up 62.7% YoY from ₹23,622 Cr in FY25 (MoD, Apr 2026). Also fixes a labeling error: the published '₹21,083 Cr (2024-25)' was actually the FY2023-24 figure — FY25 actual was ₹23,622 Cr. MoD itself uses the '56-fold since 2013-14' framing. Verdict unchanged (NDA Stronger), now stronger. DPSUs 54.8% / private 45.2% of FY26 exports; 80+ destination countries. · PIB — The Defence Decade · Defence exports ₹38,424 Cr FY26 · FY25 actual ₹23,622 Cr |
| L4 | PLI Scheme — Production Output (₹ Lakh Crore, cumulative) | — | — (scheme didn't exist) | ~₹20.4 L Cr cumulative production/sales (Dec 2025) across 14 PLI sectors | N/A (P1 had no PLI) | ₹20.4 L Cr (NDA launch) | NDA Stronger | Production Linked Incentive (PLI) scheme launched 2020-21 across 14 sectors — ₹1.97 lakh crore in total incentives allocated. Output: mobile phones (Apple exports ₹1.2L cr), textiles, pharma API, solar panels, white goods, specialty steel. PLI generated 8+ lakh jobs by 2024. India's mobile phone export went from ₹1,556 crore (FY18) to ₹1.28 lakh crore (FY24) — a structural shift. P1 had no equivalent demand-side production incentive scheme. This is a P2-only achievement. DPIIT / PIB ⟳ Aug 2026 update: Published ₹12 L Cr (2024) is stale: DPIIT 2025 year-end review reports cumulative sales >₹20.41 L Cr, investment >₹2.16 L Cr, exports >₹8.3 L Cr, and 14.39 lakh jobs as of Dec 31, 2025. Notes should also update the jobs figure (8 lakh → 14+ lakh) and the mobile-export illustration (FY24 ₹1.28 L Cr → FY26 ₹2.59 L Cr). Verdict unchanged (NDA Stronger; P2-only scheme). · DPIIT 2025 year-end review · PLI investment ₹2.4 L Cr, 14+ lakh jobs (Jul 2026) |
| L5 | FDI Equity Inflows — Cumulative (USD Billion, per era) | ~$12B (2003-04) | ~$34B annual (2013-14) | ~$59B equity / ~$94.5B total (FY2025-26)NDA era cumulative: ~$640B equity (through FY26) | UPA era cumulative: ~$250B | NDA era cumulative: ~$640B (through FY26) | NDA Stronger | Verdict based on cumulative FDI equity inflows per era: NDA era attracted ~$581 billion vs UPA era ~$250 billion. NDA's annual FDI ranged $44-84 billion (FY15-FY22), peaking at $84B in FY21-22 (COVID-recovery surge + PLI announcements). UPA peak: $47B (FY08-09). Note: some of the NDA-era surge is global capital chasing emerging markets + Mauritius/Singapore route cleanup (higher transparency). Absolute inflows decisively higher under NDA. DPIIT FDI Statistics / RBI Annual Report ⟳ Aug 2026 update: FY26 actuals now out: FDI equity inflows $58.85B (+18% YoY, a record; DPIIT), total FDI including reinvested earnings ₹8.25 L Cr ≈ $94.5B. The published '~$45B annual (2024)' should be replaced with the FY26 actual. NDA-era cumulative equity moves from ~$581B (through FY25) to roughly ~$640B — this last number is computed ($581B + $58.85B), not independently published, so label as approximate. Verdict unchanged (NDA Stronger). · FDI equity $58.85B FY26 (DPIIT data) · IBEF — total FDI ₹8.25 L Cr / $94.5B FY26 |
| NEW | Mobile Phone Production — Value (₹ Crore, annual) | ~nil (2003 — large-scale assembly began only ~2006) | ₹18,900 Cr (2014-15) | ₹6.27 L Cr (2025-26)exports ₹2.59 L Cr | +~₹18,900 Cr (from near-zero) | +₹6.08 L Cr (~33x) | NDA Stronger | The cleanest single number in India's manufacturing story. From ₹18,900 Cr in FY15 to ₹6.27 lakh Cr in FY26 (~30 crore units; ICEA), with exports at ₹2.59 lakh Cr — one in four India-made smartphones is now exported, iPhones to the US the flagship. Yes, this is assembly-heavy with imported components, and yes P1 started from zero so any base-effect argument cuts both ways — but the 33x scale-up, PLI-driven, happened entirely in P2. ICEA — ₹18,900 Cr FY15 baseline / FY26 production ₹6.27 L Cr, exports ₹2.59 L Cr / ICEA — $75B FY26 production |
| NEW | Crude Steel Production (Million Tonnes, annual) | ~38 MT (2004-05) | 81.5 MT (2013-14) | 170.2 MT (2025-26) | +43.5 MT (~2.1x) | +88.6 MT (~2.1x) | Mixed | A genuine rarity in this comparison: both eras delivered an almost identical ~2.1x doubling. NDA added far more absolute tonnage (+89 MT vs +44 MT) and took India from 4th to 2nd-largest producer globally, but UPA's doubling came off the smaller base at a marginally faster relative clip — by this article's usual absolute-value standard NDA edges it, but the symmetry is the story. FY26 figure is the government's 170.15 MT (Rajya Sabha reply); JPC provisional says 168.4 MT. FY26 crude steel 170.15 MT (govt) / Ministry of Steel AR 2013-14 — 81.54 MT / ~38 MT in 2004-05 (National Steel Policy) |
| NEW | Automobile Production — Total Vehicles (Million Units, annual, SIAM) | 7.24M (2003-04) | 21.48M (2013-14) | 31.03M (2024-25) | +14.2M (~3x) | +9.6M (+44%) | UPA Stronger | UPA wins this one on both metrics that matter: absolute (+14.2M vs +9.6M vehicles) and relative (3x vs 1.4x). The 2004-2014 decade was India's motorization boom — two-wheeler mass adoption plus the Maruti/Hyundai small-car wave. P2's slower absolute addition reflects a maturing market, demonetization/GST disruptions, the FY20-21 collapse, and the premiumization shift (value grew faster than units — PV sales hit a record 4.3M in FY25). But on the metric as defined, the base effect excuse doesn't rescue P2 here. SIAM statistics / 2003-04 production 7,243,564 (SIAM data) / FY25 segment production totals ≈31.0M (SIAM) |
| NEW | Cement Production (Million Tonnes, annual) | ~117 MT (2003-04) | ~280 MT (2014) | ~453 MT (2024-25) | +~163 MT (~2.4x) | +~173 MT (~1.6x) | Mixed | Near-dead-heat on absolute tonnes added (+163 vs +173 MT), clear UPA edge on relative growth (2.4x vs 1.6x from a base twice as large). Cement tracks construction more than policy, so this is really a proxy for the infra-plus-housing cycle running through both eras. Series caveat: 2003-04 and FY25 are Indian fiscal-year figures (industry/IBEF), 2014 is the USGS calendar-year figure (280 MT) — close enough for charting but not one continuous official series. USGS series — 2014: 280 MT / 2003-04 production ~117-124 MT / FY25 production ~453 MT |
L. Manufacturing & Industry — Section Score (9 metrics)
5
NDA ↑
0
UPA ↑
1
Mixed
M. Global Context — India vs G7 Baseline
Before declaring a winner between two Indian governments, the honest question is: how did the world do in the same period? Both eras faced global shocks — the 2008 Financial Crisis hit P1, COVID-19 hit P2. To compare fairly, you need to benchmark against what was happening globally, not just domestically.
Key insight: COVID-19 (2020) caused an average -6.4% GDP contraction across G7 economies. India's -6.6% was in line with the global shock — it was not a policy failure unique to India. Any comparison that treats 2020 as a P2 governance failure is misleading. Both the GFC (2008-09) and COVID (2020) were exogenous shocks. The right comparison is outperformance vs peers, not absolute growth rate.
GDP Growth Rate Comparison — India vs G7 (avg annual real %)
| Economy | P1: 2005–14 Avg Growth (%) | Global Shock in P1 (2009, GFC) | P2: 2014–24 Avg Growth (%) | Global Shock in P2 (2020, COVID) | India Outperformance vs this economy (P1) | India Outperformance vs this economy (P2) | Notes & Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 🇺🇸 USA | 6.8% | +7.9% (2009 — resilient) | 6.2% (7.3% ex-COVID) | −5.8% (milder than G7 avg) | +5.7pp vs G7 avg | +4.8pp vs G7 avg (+5.9pp ex-COVID) | World Bank |
| 🇬🇧 UK | 1.1% | −4.2% | 0.9% | −11.0% | +6.8pp | +4.9pp (+6.3pp ex-COVID) | World Bank |
| 🇩🇪 Germany | 1.4% | −5.6% | 0.6% | −4.6% | +6.5pp | +5.2pp (+6.6pp ex-COVID) | World Bank |
| 🇫🇷 France | 0.9% | −2.9% | 0.8% | −8.0% | +7.0pp | +5.0pp (+6.4pp ex-COVID) | World Bank |
| 🇯🇵 Japan | 0.4% | −5.4% | 0.3% | −4.3% | +7.5pp | +5.5pp (+6.9pp ex-COVID) | World Bank |
| 🇨🇦 Canada | 1.9% | −2.9% | 1.8% | −5.3% | +6.0pp | +4.0pp (+5.4pp ex-COVID) | World Bank |
| 🇮🇹 Italy | −0.3% | −5.5% | 0.5% | −9.0% | +8.2pp | +5.3pp (+6.7pp ex-COVID) | World Bank |
| G7 Average | ~1.1% | ~−4.1% | ~1.0% | ~−6.4% | — | — | Simple average across 7 economies |
| 🇮🇳 India (UPA → NDA) | 7.9% | +6.7% (2009 — resilient) | 5.8% (7.2% ex-COVID) | −6.6% (in line with G7 avg) | +6.8pp vs G7 avg | +4.8pp vs G7 avg (+6.2pp ex-COVID) | World Bank / IMF WEO |
| 🇨🇳 China | 10.0% | +9.4% (2009 — stimulus-driven) | 5.9% | +2.3% (only major economy to grow) | −3.3pp | +0.3pp (+1.4pp ex-COVID) | The most-requested missing comparator: India trailed China by 3.3pp in P1 but edged ahead in P2 as China slowed from double digits to ~5% (2025: +5.0%). World Bank — China GDP growth / World Bank API (updated 2026-07-13) |
| 🇮🇩 Indonesia | 5.7% | +4.6% (2009 — resilient) | 4.4% | −2.1% | +1.0pp | +1.8pp (+2.9pp ex-COVID) | The fairest emerging-market peer (large, domestic-demand-driven): India's edge over Indonesia widened from +1.0pp in P1 to +1.8pp in P2. World Bank — Indonesia GDP growth / World Bank API (updated 2026-07-13) |
| 🇧🇷 Brazil | 3.5% | −0.1% (2009 — near-flat) | 1.0% | −3.3% | +3.3pp | +5.2pp (+6.3pp ex-COVID) | Cautionary BRICS contrast: Brazil decelerated from 3.5% to 1.0% across the same two windows (2015-16 recession), so India's lead nearly doubled. World Bank — Brazil GDP growth / World Bank API (updated 2026-07-13) |
| 🌍 World Average | 3.0% | −1.3% | 2.9% | −2.9% | +3.7pp | +3.3pp (+4.4pp ex-COVID) | Anchors the table: world growth was nearly identical across both windows (3.0% vs 2.9%), so India's slight P1->P2 outperformance dip is India-specific, not a global-slowdown artifact. World Bank — World GDP growth / World Bank API (updated 2026-07-13) |
What this table tells us
Both eras massively outperformed the developed world. India's P1 outperformed G7 average by +6.8pp per year; P2 outperformed by +4.8pp (or +6.2pp excluding the COVID year that hit every major economy at roughly the same magnitude). Neither era was riding global tailwinds — G7 economies were largely stagnant in both periods.
The COVID comparison is crucial. India contracted -6.6% in 2020. The G7 average was -6.4%. The UK fell -11%, France -8%, Italy -9%. India's COVID response, measured purely by economic contraction, was comparable to the global peer group — not a unique underperformance. Penalising P2 for COVID without the same lens on P1 for the 2008 GFC is asymmetric analysis.
On growth rate, the comparison is genuinely Mixed. Headline: P1 7.9% vs P2 5.9% (incl. COVID) or 7.1% ex-COVID. Ex-COVID, the gap is ~0.8pp — within noise. The headline tilts to P1 only when you don't adjust for: (a) a much smaller base ($618B vs $2T — growing the smaller economy 7.9% is mechanically easier), (b) post-2003 EM tailwinds (commodity supercycle, pre-GFC capital abundance), and (c) the fact that P2 absorbed three structural shocks (demonetisation, GST transition, COVID) where P1 absorbed one (2008 GFC, milder in impact). A clean "X stronger" verdict over-reads the data; absolute output added is captured in metrics #1 and #2 (both NDA).
What the Data Says
Where NDA was clearly stronger: Infrastructure acceleration (road km/day, solar energy, airports, metro cities), digital public goods (UPI, Jan Dhan, Aadhaar utilization), welfare coverage (Ujjwala, Swachh Bharat, Jal Jeevan, Ayushman Bharat), formalization (tax filers, DBT), LWE decline, defence indigenization, inflation control, and road safety per vehicle. These are genuine and measurable improvements.
Where UPA was stronger: Average GDP growth rate (higher), poverty reduction speed (steeper absolute decline), mobile subscriber growth (the mobile revolution decade), FDI growth rate, university expansion, child stunting reduction, and wind energy. The UPA era also launched the foundational infrastructure for digital India — Aadhaar, MGNREGA, RTI, NREGA — that the NDA era leveraged.
Where things genuinely declined under NDA: Press freedom (rank fell from 140 to 159), democracy index (downgraded to hybrid regime), real rural wages (stagnated), Global Hunger Index rank (111 vs 55), fiscal deficit (wider), child wasting (barely improved), and RTI institutional strength. On income inequality: India's income Gini (World Bank) has actually marginally improved and India ranks among the world's most equal by income — but wealth inequality rose sharply, driven largely by global asset price inflation rather than policy alone. These are real tensions that deserve honest accounting.
The honest verdict across 201 data points: NDA was stronger on 119 — infrastructure, transport, digital public goods, health outcomes, innovation, security, space, manufacturing output, defence exports, and bottom-of-pyramid living standards (LPG, electricity, bank accounts, tap water). UPA was stronger on 22 — governance quality metrics, press freedom, general government debt, early poverty reduction, merchandise-export growth, agri exports, and women's representation pace. 60 were mixed — base effects, saturation ceilings, methodology changes, or genuinely comparable performance. NDA built on the institutional and infrastructure base that UPA constructed; both eras are chapters in the same India story.
The base effect caveat is real but cuts both ways. Critics of the 2005–14 era correctly note that India grew fast partly from a low base. But critics of the 2014–24 era make the same mistake in reverse — crediting policy when improved global conditions, cheap smartphones (a private sector led disruption: Jio), and UPA-era foundations (Aadhaar, MGNREGA, NITI) did much of the heavy lifting.
No single metric captures what it feels like to live in India. These 201 data points are a starting point, not a verdict.
Data notes: All data points are sourced from publicly available government and international databases. Where government data and independent sources differ significantly, both are cited. For metrics not available at exactly 2005/2014/2024, the closest available year is used. Growth rates are approximate and rounded. This analysis is independent — no data point has been selectively included to favor either political position. Errors or updates: contact me.